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INTRODUCTION 
 
Collective bargaining in the municipal sector is rather unique. It boasts some of the 
highest strike prevalence in recent years.1 A common feature of such strike action 
is the associated violence. The collective bargaining relationship is further unique 
in that the majority trade union, the South African Municipal Workers’ Union 
(Samwu), is affiliated to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
who in turn is in alliance with the African National Congress (ANC). The ANC in 
turn is the outright majority political party in the South African Local Government 
Association (SALGA), the employers’ association.   
 It would be assumed that given the organic link between Samwu and the 
ruling ANC that collective bargaining would be smooth sailing. This has proven not 
to be the case. To the contrary, the bargaining relationship is indicative of 
apartheid style wage bargaining where ideological characterisations informs 
bargaining approaches. 
 This is predominantly informed by local government authorities driving a 
neo-liberal agenda which includes greater commercialisation and externalisation of 
the sector informed by capitalist market imperatives. Samwu on the other hand 
seek to preserve local government as the deliverer of municipal services. It 
records that:  
 Our vision for local government has, as a starting point, placing people at the 
 centre of transformation. It encompasses policies that address the needs of the 
 working class and the poor (such as job creation and poverty eradication 
 measures). It envisages reversing existing policies which seek to please local 
 and international capital as opposed to local communities. 
 It is a vision that is informed by our longer term vision for a socialist South Africa.  
 In advancing  this struggle, we hold the view that the state is ultimately an 
 instrument of class rule. The South African state, while it has introduced some 
 social democratic policies and measures that are friendly to the working class, 
 in the main represents the interest of monopoly capital and a growing middle 
 class.  Our vision therefore seeks to transcend the constraints imposed on local 
 government by adherence to a neo-liberal macro-economic framework.2 
                                                          
1
 Tokiso Dispute Resolution Digest (2012) 16. 
2 SAMWU:  Re-imagining local government (2012). 
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The 2011 round of wage bargaining in the sector followed a trend of 
collective bargaining in the sector – that of failed negotiations with resulting strike 
action.3 Whereas in other strikes Samwu was able to induce settlement with Salga, 
that was not to be the case in 2011.  
This dissertation attempts to look at why the 2011 strike was a failure, from 
the perspective of Samwu.4 It looks at the framework of public sector collective 
bargaining, internationally; within the framework of the constitution and labour 
legislation; the bargaining parties and their inter-relations; strike theory with a view 
to locate the failure of the strike within that theory and finally, proposes a set of 
organisational options for Samwu to consider.    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 The union engaged in strike action in 2002, 2005, 2006, 2009 and 2010.  
4
 I must declare that I have been employed by Samwu since 2004 and currently hold the position of 
regional secretary in the Cape Town region. I do this declaration as the dissertation is written both 
objectively and subjectively given my own role and understanding of the peculiarities in the 2011 wage 
negotiations and subsequent strike action.   
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CHAPTER 1 
The municipal sector and collective bargaining  
 
1.1 Fundamental ILO Conventions 
Collective bargaining, like many other features of society has its roots in 
international policy structures which seek to set the platform for its operation at a 
National level. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is the institutional 
forum that is tasked with this function. The ILO is a specialist agency of the United 
Nations (UN) and created by the League of Nations following the 1919 Treaty of 
Versailles that ended the First World War. It has four strategic objectives which are 
to: 
 Promote and realize standards and fundamental principles and rights at work 
 Create greater opportunities for women and men to decent employment income 
 Enhance the coverage and effectiveness of social protection for all 
 Strengthen tripartism and social dialogue5 
 
 These strategic objectives are achieved by the social partners 
(governments, employers and labour) setting international standards in the form of 
Conventions, Recommendations and Codes of Practice which, following its 
adoption, must be ratified by member Countries.   
There are currently 189 ILO Conventions and 202 Recommendations6 of 
which eight are deemed fundamental ILO Conventions7. Two of these Conventions 
are primarily concerned with the application of collective bargaining. These are the 
                                                          
5
 Charnovitz, Steve ‘The Influence of International Labour Standards on the World Trading Regime - A 
Historical Overview’ (1987) 126 Int'l Lab. Rev. 565-584 and Hepple, Bob ‘New Approaches to International 
Labour Regulation’ (1997) 26 Indus. L.J. 353-366. In the Hepple article, at page 357, he notes that ‘the 
dominant feature of ILO standards from the Declaration of Philadelphia 1944 onwards was their 
promotion of freedom of association, collective bargaining and tripartism. These pro-collective standards 
now have to fight for survival in an increasingly individualistic climate.’  
6
 ILO Information System on International Labour Standards (NORMLEX). Available at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:1:0::NO::: (accessed 20 November 2012). 
7
 The 8 Fundamental Conventions are: Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (C29); Freedom of Association 
and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (C87); Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (C98); Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (C100); Abolition of Forced 
Labour Convention, 1957 (C105); Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (C111); 
Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (C138); Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (C182). Available 
at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-
islamabad/documents/policy/wcms_143046.pdf (accessed 20 November 2012). 
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Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 
(C87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 
(C98). Neither Convention 87 nor 98 mentions a right to strike but it is now 
accepted that implicit in freedom of association is the right to strike.8  Article 6 of 
the latter Convention is of particular concern in that the term thereof ‘does not deal 
with the position of public servants engaged in the administration of the State’9. 
South Africa as a member state of the ILO ratified all eight fundamental 
Conventions.10   
I hold the view that it is not inadvertent that Convention C98 does not 
concern the public service11. This is because public sector employees, in South 
Africa and indeed elsewhere, were denied the right to engage in collective 
bargaining processes12 ostensibly because they are public ‘servants’.13 As the 
Explanatory memorandum to the draft Labour Relations Bill aptly puts its;  
There is no theoretical justification for separate statutes for the public service, 
teachers and farm workers. The existence of separate statutes is due largely to 
historical and partly to political circumstances. Traditionally, public service 
employees were regarded as servants of the monarch to whom absolute loyalty 
was owed. The doctrine of state sovereignty, a more modern manifestation of this 
approach, regards the state as answerable only to the legislature. Any attempt to 
curtail its right to act unilaterally, through the impact of trade unions, collective 
                                                          
8
 See in this regard Servais, Jean-Michel ‘ILO Law and the Right to Strike’ 15 Canadian Lab. & Emp. L.J. 147 
(2009-2010) 147-164; Leader, Sheldon ‘Can You Derive a Right to Strike from the Right to Freedom of 
Association’ 15 Canadian Lab. & Emp. L.J. 271 (2009-2010) 271-296; Regenbogen, Sonia ‘The International 
Labour Organization and Freedom of Association: Does Freedom of Association Include the Right to 
Strike?’ (2012) 16(2) Ca adian Labour & Employment Law Journal 385-418 
9
 Ibid 6. 
10
 It is worth noting that South Africa has not ratified Convention 151 (Convention concerning Protection 
of the Right to Organise and Procedures for Determining Conditions of Employment in the Public Service), 
1978 and its accompanying Recommendation No. 159 (1978). Article 8 of that Convention specifically 
provides that ‘The settlement of disputes arising in connection with the determination of terms and 
conditions of employment shall be sought, as may be appropriate to national conditions, 
through negotiation between the parties or through independent and impartial machinery, such as 
mediation, conciliation and arbitration, established in such a manner as to ensure the confidence of the 
parties involved.’  Available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---
dialogue/documents/publication/wcms_168333.pdf  (Accessed on 23 January 2013). 
11
 The Public sector is broadly defined to include local states/government. 
12
 The Industrial Conciliation Act, 11 of 1924 and its successor excluded the public service with their 
remuneration and conditions of employment being determined by the Public Services Commission. See in 
this regard Godfrey, S & Bamu, P ‘The state of centralised bargaining and possible future trends’ in le 
Roux, Rochelle & Rycroft, Alan (eds) Reinventing Labour Law (2012) at page 238. 
13
 Casale, Giuseppe & Tenkorang, Joseph ‘Public service labour relations: A comparative overview’(Social 
Dialogue, Labour Law and Labour Administration Branch, International Labour Office, Geneva August 
2008) 
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bargaining or certain employment protections is eschewed. This approach is 
regarded as outdated and anachronistic, in South Africa and internationally.14 
   
It is worth noting here that the 1990 South African Municipal Workers’ Union 
(Samwu) strike was indicative of the collective bargaining relations within the 
public sector in South Africa. It was noted that; 
The Cape Town strike comes after massive strike action in the public sector in 
recent months, in particular the railways and hospitals strike. Like the others, the 
Cape Town strike was illegal in terms of the LRA, which regards municipal 
services as ‘essential services’. But this has been used as a gun to the heads of 
workers, who have been expected to endure extremely low rates of pay and poor 
working conditions. The strike has forced the city council to negotiate more 
seriously with the union. It is part of the breakdown of industrial relations in the 
public sector, and adds to the increasing pressure on the state to reconsider.15  
 
1.2 The ILO Convention No. 151, 1978 and Recommendation No. 159, 1978 
As indicated earlier, the core ILO Convention regulating Collective Bargaining, the 
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (C98), does not 
concern the public service. This was largely due to the ideological view that public 
service employees are ‘servants’ of the state and, therefore, at the beckon of their 
Masters.  
 This situation changed with the advent of neo-liberal policies adopted by 
states which had the effect of public servants challenging their collective 
bargaining standing with their employers. This prompted the ILO to recognise the 
need to set International standards for public sector employees in the form of a 
Convention. This led to the ILO Convention No. 151, 1978 and Recommendation 
No. 159, 1978. This much was recognised by the General Conference of the ILO 
which met in 1978.16 
                                                          
14
 (1995) 16 ILJ 278 at 287-288. 
15
 Pillay, Devan ‘To hell with Councillors’! Municipal Workers strike against Cape Town’s ‘liberal’ City 
Council 15 (2) SALB at 14. 
16 The introductory statements of that General Conference reads; The General Conference of the 
International Labour Organisation,  
Having been convened at Geneva by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, and having 
met in its Sixty-fourth Session on 7 June 1978, and  
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 It is to be remembered that a key function of the ILO is to ‘promoting social 
justice and internationally recognized human and labour rights, pursuing its 
founding mission that labour peace is essential to prosperity17. Further substance 
to this claim is to be found in the following ILO quote; 
Public sector decision-makers often seek to maximize social welfare both 
efficiently and equitably. As a result, they may choose employment policies that 
minimize the cost of providing public services, or to resolve labour market 
imperfections elsewhere in the economy. In doing so, policy-makers have 
inevitably taken decisions which affect employment conditions and the interest of 
workers. The ILO encourages policy-makers to take into account the interest of 
workers in order to minimize conflict. For that purpose, ILO constituents adopted 
the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151) and the Labour 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Noting the terms of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 
1948, the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949, and the Workers' 
Representatives Convention and Recommendation, 1971, and  
Recalling that the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949, does not cover certain 
categories of public employees and that the Workers' Representatives Convention and Recommendation, 
1971, apply to workers' representatives in the undertaking, and  
Noting the considerable expansion of public-service activities in many countries and the need for sound 
labour relations between public authorities and public employees' organisations, and  
Having regard to the great diversity of political, social and economic systems among member States and 
the differences in practice among them (e.g. as to the respective functions of central and local 
government, of federal, state and provincial authorities, and of state-owned undertakings and various 
types of autonomous or semi-autonomous public bodies, as well as to the nature of employment 
relationships), and  
Taking into account the particular problems arising as to the scope of, and definitions for the purpose of, 
any international instrument, owing to the differences in many countries between private and public 
employment, as well as the difficulties of interpretation which have arisen in respect of the application of 
relevant provisions of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949, to public 
servants, and the observations of the supervisory bodies of the ILO on a number of occasions that some 
governments have applied these provisions in a manner which excludes large groups of public employees 
from coverage by that Convention, and  
Having decided upon the adoption of certain proposals with regard to freedom of association and 
procedures for determining conditions of employment in the public service, which is the fifth item on the 
agenda of the session, and  
Having determined that these proposals shall take the form of an international Convention,  
adopts this twenty-seventh day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-eight the 
following Convention, which may be cited as the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978:  
17
ILO Mission and Objectives. Available at http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/mission-and-
objectives/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 22 November 2012) 
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Relations (Public Service) Recommendation, 1978 (No.159), which provide 
minimum standards and guidance for government employers to follow.18 
 
 It is worth noting that at present only 57 out of 185 (less than one third) ILO 
member states ratified convention No. 151.19 This must be compared to the 183 
ILO member states that ratified Convention No. 98 (Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949).20 It certainly presents a bleak picture as 
to the seriousness public sector employment and collective bargaining recognition 
is given by ILO member states. This should be worrisome from an ILO perspective 
with recent developments in the European ‘PIIGS’21 countries where austerity 
measures are, in effect, eroding workers’ rights, particularly in the public sector22 
 The sections that follow will look at how the policy perspectives of the ILO, 
and indeed the facets of neo-liberalism, fit within the South African local 
government sector, both from a legislative and collective bargaining perspective.  
1.3 The advent of Neo-Liberalism 
1.3.1 Neo-Liberalism Defined 
The manner in which the public sector (including local government) delivered 
services rapidly changed during the period 1970 – 1980. These changes were 
precipitated by the global economic crisis at the time. Governments were 
persuaded that they needed to restructure the nature of public service delivery 
more in line with Capitalist principles than the Keynesian welfare state of the 
time.23 These changes became known as Neo-liberalism.24 The key characteristics 
                                                          
18
 Manual on collective bargaining and dispute resolution in the Public Service, Sectoral Activities 
Department, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2011 at VII - VIII 
19 Available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:20020:0::NO::: (accessed 22 November 
2012) 
20
 Supra note 18.  
21
 The term “PIIGS” is used to describe the worst economically performing Euro Zone Countries. These 
countries include Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Greece and Spain. 
22
 Sarah Krouse (19 March 2012). "Investing in PIIGS: Portugal". Financial News. Available at 
http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2012-03-19/investing-in-piigs-portugal. (Accessed 22 November 
2012)  
23
 Brenner, N and Theodore N (2002), Cities and the Geographies of “Actually Existing Neoliberalism.  
24
 Harvey, D. (2006), Neo-Liberalism as Creative Destruction. Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human 
Geography, 88: 145–158;  McDonald, David A and Smith, Laila ‘Privatising Cape Town: From Apartheid to 
Neo-liberalism in the Mother City’ (2004) 41 Urban Studies, No. 8, 1461–1484; Greg Ruiters 
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of Neo-liberalist policies include privatisation, outsourcing, fiscal discipline and cut 
backs in social expenditure.25  
1.3.2 The Impact of Neo-liberalism on the public sector 
The introduction of these Neo-liberal policies had a negative impact on public 
sector collective bargaining internationally due mainly to the decline in union 
density and collective bargaining coverage.26 This situation has worsened in 
recent periods due to the Global economic meltdown which started in 2008 in the 
United States and across the Euro Zone with the Greek economy at a near 
collapse had it not been for a bail out of that economy. Such bail-outs come at a 
significant price - the adoption of austerity measures.27 In the case of Greece this 
has meant downsizing the public sector; large scale privatisation; wage freezes; 
increasing of the pensionable age; decreasing the minimum wage; restructuring 
the tax system; increasing value added tax (VAT); a decrease in labour standards 
by dismantling collective bargaining systems and move towards non-standard 
forms of employment practices, etc.28  
Workers in the ‘PIIGS’ countries embarked on general strikes against these 
stringent austerity measures. These general strikes were met with the full might of 
the armed forces seeking to quell the discontent express by workers. Protesters, 
unarmed, were beaten by riot police.29  
South Africa has not been immune to developments of this nature. The 
adoption of neo-liberal reforms in South Africa date back to the same period as the 
advent of neo-liberalism internationally. The apartheid state was highly 
                                                                                                                                                                            
‘Contradictions in municipal services in contemporary South Africa: Disciplinary commodification and 
self-disconnections’ (2007) 27 Critical Social Policy no. 4, 487-508. 
25
 McDonald, D. A. (2008) World Class Syndrome: Neoliberalism and Inequality in Cape Town at page 71. 
26
 Op cit note 13. 
27
 Kouretas Georgios P. & Vlamis Prodromos ‘The Greek crisis: Causes and implications’ (2010) 57 
Panoeconomicus no 4, 391-404; Chamley, Christophe & Pinto, Brian ‘Why Official Bailouts Tend Not to 
Work: An Example Motivated by Greece 2010’ The Economists’ Voice February, 2011 1-5. 
28
 IRASA and Institute of Development and Labour Law (UCT) Breakfast Discourse led by Emeritus 
Professor Manfred Weiss on the topic:  Crisis Management in the European Union and its Impact on 
Labour Law and Working Conditions, Leeuwenhof, Cape Town, 12 October 2012. 
29 Anti-Austerity Protests Spark Violence in European Countries - SPIEGEL ONLINE. Available at  
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/anti-austerity-protests-spark-violence-in-european-
countries-a-867316.html (Accessed on 25 November 2012) 
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interventionist: it created a range of parastatals to assist capital accumulation; it 
presided over the consolidation of an Afrikaner nationalist capitalist class; and, 
finally established a welfare state serving the interests largely of white workers and 
the white urban and rural middle class.30 By the early 1970s, growth rates in South 
Africa began to decline. Facing a mighty political, economic and social crisis, the 
apartheid regime increasingly adopted neoliberal policies that signalled a shift 
away from the high degree of state intervention, including cutting back on the 
‘racially’ differentiated social spending. It also became increasingly evident that the 
days of apartheid rule were numbered.31 The more far-sighted sections of the 
South African ruling class began to woo the African National Congress (ANC) 
secretly.32 
The South African Municipal Workers’ Union (Samwu) strike in Cape Town 
in 1990 had key demands, such as an end to casualization and the filling of all 
vacant positions.33 These demands were directly linked to the prevailing neo-
liberal policies. 
In the course of the negotiated settlement, the ANC shifted rapidly to the 
right and dumped the nationalisation clause in the Freedom Charter.34 By 1996 it 
moved away from the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), its 1994 
elections programme, in a completely undemocratic manner,35 in favour of an 
                                                          
30 Parnell, Susan, and Pieterse, Edgar "Developmental local government." Parnell et al (2002): 79-91. 
31 See in this regard Habib, Adam and Padayachee, Vishnu. “Economic Policy and Power Relations in South 
Africa's Transition to Democracy” (2000). Available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/science/article/pii/S0305750X99001308 (Accessed on 
01 February 2013). 
32 Esterhuyse, Willie Endgame: Secret Talks and the End of Apartheid (2012) 
33
 Ibid 15. 
34
 Adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown, 26 June 1955. The Freedom Charter was the 
statement of core principles of the South African Congress Alliance, which consisted of the African 
National Congress and its allies the South African Indian Congress, the South African Congress of 
Democrats and the Coloured People’s Congress. Available at www.anc.org.za (Accessed on 31 January 
2013). 
35 The secretariat report to the 1996 Cosatu National Congress read ‘The introduction of GEAR (the 
reverse GEAR of our society) in June 1996 (two months before it was discussed in constitutional 
structures of the ANC) followed by Maria Ramos and Trevor Manuel’s pronouncement that the strategy is 
non-negotiable is the most serious example of this problem.  GEAR in this respect, however, was not 
unusual. It followed a pattern of treating the Alliance with contempt by certain Ministers on issues of 
governance and policy formulation. This approach should be abandoned since all it does is cause 
unnecessary tensions within the movement as well as retard progress.’ Cosatu believed that the adoption 
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orthodox neoliberal strategy called the Growth Employment and Redistribution 
(Gear)36 economic policy.  
It is clear that the new democratic state constituted itself as a neoliberal 
state from the outset. By 2000, the transition from apartheid-capitalism to 
neoliberal capitalism in the local state arena was completed. The number of 
municipalities had been reduced to 284, a series of New Public Management 
reforms37 had been adopted and other key neoliberal policies were firmly in 
place.38  
 Tri-partite institutional forums were set up along the lines of the ILO, that is, 
comprising of government, the business sector and organised labour.39 These 
forums, most notably the National Economic Development and Labour Council 
(NEDLAC)40 would be ‘the vehicle by which government, labour business and 
community organisations will seek to cooperate, through problem-solving and 
negotiation on economic, labour and development issues, and related challenges 
facing the country.’41  
 Whether any of these institutional reforms are going to yield the desired 
results remains questionable. Already there is growing discontent that the 
collective bargaining instruments needs a major overhaul.42 The recent strike wave 
                                                                                                                                                                            
of economic policy, like the RDP, had to be debated within Alliance structures which were not the case 
with the GEAR policy.  
36 Adelzadeh, Asghar. "From the RDP to GEAR: the gradual embracing of neo-liberalism in economic 
policy." Transformation 31 (1996). 
37 For a commentary on New Public Management reforms see Professor Robert Cameron, Department of 
Political Studies, University of Cape Town ‘New Public Management Reforms in the South African Public 
Service: 1999-2008’ Paper presented at Political Studies departmental seminar, 28 April 2009.   
38
 Bardouille, N. C. (2000) The Transformation of Governance Paradigms and Modalities: Insights into the 
marketization of the public service in response to globalization. 
39
 A number of these forums were established in the early 1990s. These include the National Economic 
Forum, the National Electrification Forum, the National Education and Training Forum, the National 
Health Forum, the National Housing Forum and National Transport Policy Forum. 
40
 Successor in title to the National Economic Forum.  
41 Nedlac founding declaration. Available at http://www.nedlac.org.za/about-us/founding-
declaration.aspx (accessed on 23 November 2012) 
42
 Du Toit, D ‘What is the future of collective bargaining (and labour law) in South Africa?’ (2007) 28 ILJ 
1405-1436; Godfrey, S & Bamu, P ‘The state of centralised bargaining and possible future trends’ in le 
Roux, Rochelle & Rycroft, Alan (eds) Reinventing Labour Law (2012) 219-243 
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in the mining, transport and grape/wine sectors is a clear illustration of these 
developments where these strikes happened outside the established collective 
bargaining framework or were taking shape outside the traditional bargaining 
agents, the trade unions. 
1.4 The South African Constitution 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa43 is the supreme law of the 
Republic.44 The final constitution followed an arduous negotiation process 
involving multi-party negotiators seeking to advance their respective political 
positions. Parties reached agreement on a final constitution, albeit after much 
bloodshed throughout the country.  
1.4.1 The status of local government as a sphere of government 
 The Constitution recognises three spheres of government, that is, National, 
Provincial and Local government with are ‘distinctive, interdependent and 
interrelated’.45 Section 41 of the Constitution defines the key principles of co-
operative government and intergovernmental relations.46 The intergovernmental 
                                                          
43
 Act 108 of 1996. 
44
 S 2 of the Constitution. 
45
 S 40 of the Constitution.  
46
 The key principles set out in section 41 of the constitution are;  
(1) All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must- 
(a) preserve the peace, national unity and the indivisibility of the Republic; 
(b) secure the well-being of the people of the Republic; 
(c) provide effective, tra sparent, accountable and coherent government for the Republic as a whole; 
(d) be loyal to the Constitution, the Republic and its people; 
(e) respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in the other 
spheres; 
(f) not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution; 
(g) exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the 
geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere; and 
(h) co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by- 
(i) fostering friendly relations; 
(ii) assisting and supporting one another; 
(iii) informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters of common interest; 
(iv) co-ordinating their actions and legislation with one another; 
(v) adhering to agreed procedures; and 
(vi) avoiding legal proceedings against one another. 
(2) An Act of Parliament must- 
(a) establish or provide for structures and institutions to promote and 
facilitate intergovernmental relations; and 
(b) provide for appropriate mechanisms and procedures to facilitate settlement of intergovernmental 
disputes. 
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relations between the three spheres of government is further spelt out in the 
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act47 
 The objects of local government is further defined ‘to provide democratic 
and accountable government for local communities; to ensure the provision of 
services to communities in a sustainable manner; to promote social and economic 
development; to promote a safe and healthy environment; and to encourage the 
involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local 
government’.48 
1.4.2. The Bill of Rights 
Chapter two of the Constitution stipulates a set of key fundamental rights that all 
citizens are entitled to. These include the following labour rights;  
 (1) Everyone has the right to fair labour practices. 
 (2) Every worker has the right- 
 (a) to form and join a trade union; 
 (b) to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union; and 
 (c) to strike. 
 (3) Every employer has the right- 
 (a) to form and join an employers' organisation; and 
 (b) to participate in the activities and programmes of an employers' organisation. 
 (4) Every trade union and every employers' organisation has the right- 
 (a) to determine its own administration, programmes and activities; 
 (b) to organise; and 
 (c) to form and join a federation. 
 (5) Every trade union, employers' organisation and employer has the right to       
 engage in collective bargaining. National legislation may be enacted to regulate 
 collective bargaining. To the extent that the legislation may limit a  right in this 
 Chapter, the limitation must comply with section 36 (1). 
                                                                                                                                                                            
(3) An organ of state involved in an intergovernmental dispute must make every reasonable effort to 
settle the dispute by means of mechanisms and procedures provided for that purpose, and must exhaust 
all other remedies before it approaches a court to resolve the dispute. 
(4) If a court is not satisfied that the requirements of subsection (3) have been met, it may refer a dispute 
back to the organs of state involved. 
47
 Act 13 of 2005. 
48
 S 152 of the Constitution 
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 (6) National legislation may recognise union security arrangements contained in 
 collective agreements. To the extent that the legislation may limit a right in this 
 Chapter the limitation must comply with section 36 (1).49 
 
 The rights of trade unions (and employers) are thus constitutionally 
entrenched. It is to be pointed out here that the right to strike has constitutional 
recognition but not so the right to lock out. In that regard the Constitutional Court 
held; 
 [The] proposition [that the right of employers to lock out is the necessary 
 equivalent of the right of workers to strike] cannot be accepted. Collective 
 Bargaining is based on the recognition of the fact that employers enjoy greater 
 social and economic power than individual workers. Workers therefore need to 
 act in concert to provide them collectively with sufficient power to bargain 
 effectively with employers. Workers exercise collective power primarily through 
 the mechanism of strike action. In theory, employers, on the other hand, may 
 exercise power against workers through a range of weapons, such as dismissal, 
 the employment of alternative or replacement labour, the unilateral 
 implementation of new terms and conditions of employment, and the exclusion of 
 workers from the workplace (the last of these being generally called a lock-out).50 
 
Like most rights, there are limitations. These will be discussed below. 
1.4.3 The Constitutional limitations  
Section 36 of the Constitution permits the rights defined in Chapter two of the 
Constitution (the Bill of Rights) to be limited ‘only in terms of law of general 
application’, like the Labour Relations Act, and providing ‘the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society’. An example of such 
limitations being the unrestricted constitutional right to strike whereas the labour 
laws permits strikes only insofar as matters of mutual interest, prohibiting strikes in 
essential services and over disputes of rights.51 
1.5 The Labour Relations Act (LRA) 
                                                          
49
 S 23 of the Constitution (1996). 
50
 Ex parte Chairman of the Constitutional Assembly: In re certification of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at 795. For a more detailed commentary see Cheadle H, Davis D, 
Haysom N South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights, Durban LexisNexis Butterworths 2003 
[2004] 1 All SA 521. 
51
Halton Cheadle, Regulated Flexibility: Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA (2006) 27 ILJ 663. Disputes of 
Rights are determined by arbitration or adjudication.  
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The Labour Relations Act52 (LRA) heralded the start of the new Industrial relations 
framework of the new South Africa. Unlike its predecessor, the 1956 act53, the 
current LRA applied to all workers in both the private and public sectors. Also, the 
new set of laws entrenched a set of minimum rights afforded to registered trade 
unions termed ‘organisational rights’.54 Whilst it is not the intention here to do a 
detailed examination of the LRA, it is important to refer to its purpose as set out in 
the act; 
 The purpose of this Act is to advance economic development, social justice, 
 labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace by fulfilling the primary 
 objects of this Act, which are-  
 (a)  to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by section  
  27 of the Constitution ;  
 (b)  to give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state  
  of the International Labour Organisation;  
 (c)  to provide a framework within which employees and their trade unions,  
  employers and employers' organisations can-  
 (i)  collectively bargain to determine wages, terms and conditions of   
  employment and other matters of mutual interest; and  
 (ii)  formulate industrial policy; and  
 (d) to promote-  
 (i)  orderly collective bargaining;  
 (ii)  collective bargaining at sectoral level;  
 (iii)  employee participation in decision-making in the workplace; and  
 (iv)  the effective resolution of labour disputes.55  
 
 The LRA does not however apply to the ‘National Defence Force, the 
National Intelligence Agency, the South African Secret Services and the South 
African National Academy of Intelligence’56. This is somewhat of departure from 
                                                          
52
 Act 66 of 1995, as amended. 
53
 Act 28 of 1956. 
54
 Chapter 3, sections 11 to 15 of the LRA. 
55
 Section 1 of the LRA (1995).  
56
 Section 2 of the LRA (1995). 
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Article 1 of the ILO Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 where 
reference is made to the exclusion of the ‘armed forces’ and the ‘police’. So, whilst 
the police are covered by the scope of public sector collective bargaining 
arrangements, as is the case with all public sector employees,57 the armed forces 
(military) are covered by a separate collective bargaining arrangement.   
1.5.1 Collective Bargaining and strikes 
As pointed out earlier, the constitution accords ‘every trade union, employers' 
organisation and employer has the right to engage in collective bargaining.’58 The 
LRA is the legislative framework giving effect to that constitutional provision. It is 
evident that it promotes collective bargaining at a sectoral level.59  
 There is no compulsion to bargain as the LRA advocates a voluntarist 
approach to collective bargaining. Employers are therefore not compelled to 
bargain with trade unions.60 This is in line with International standards set by the 
ILO which records that ‘Collective bargaining, if it is to be effective, must assume a 
voluntary character and not entail recourse to measures of compulsion which 
would alter the voluntary nature of such bargaining.’61  
  To force bargaining with an employer (or group of employers), trade unions 
sometimes need to engage in protected strike action to achieve their demand for 
recognition.62 To best describe the dynamic relationship between collective 
bargaining and strike action is to quote the Constitutional Court judgment of 
O'Regan J: 
 
 In s 23, the Constitution recognizes the importance of ensuring fair labour 
 relations. The entrenchment of the right of workers to form and join trade unions 
 and to engage in strike action, as well as the right of trade unions, employers and 
 employer organizations to engage in collective bargaining, illustrates that the 
 Constitution contemplates that collective bargaining between employers and 
                                                          
57
 At present, there is separate bargaining arrangements for the public sector generally and that of local 
government. There are however moves afoot to move local government into the public service.  
58
 Section 23(5) of the Constitution (1996). 
59
 Section 1(d)(ii). 
60
 S Godfrey, J Maree, D Du Toit & J Theron Collective Bargaining in South Africa: Past, present and future? 
(2010) Juta, Cape Town at pages 89-90. See also Du Toit et al Chapter V at page 239.  
61
 Freedom of Association: Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee 
of the Governing Body of the ILO, Fifth (revised) edition (2006) at para 925. Available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
normes/documents/publication/wcms_090632.pdf (accessed on 26 November 2012). 
62
 National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd & another (2003) 24 ILJ 305 (CC) 
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 workers is key to a fair industrial relations environment. This case concerns the 
 right to strike. That right is both of historical and contemporaneous significance. 
 In the first place, it is of importance for the dignity of workers who in our 
 constitutional order may not be treated as coerced employees. Secondly, it is 
 through industrial action that workers are able to assert bargaining power in 
 industrial relations. The right to strike is an important component of a successful 
 collective bargaining system. In interpreting the rights in s 23, therefore, the 
 importance of those rights in promoting a fair working environment must be 
 understood. It is also important to comprehend the dynamic nature of the wage-
 work bargain and the context within which it takes place. Care must be taken to 
 avoid setting in constitutional concrete, principles governing that bargain which 
 may become obsolete or inappropriate as social and economic conditions 
 change.63 
 
1.5.2. Relevant sections of the LRA concerning Collective Bargaining 
Arrangements 
This dissertation makes the assumption that the LRA advocates collective 
bargaining at sectoral level. This does not mean to suggest that collective 
bargaining cannot exist at plant/factory or industry level.64 That, however, is not 
the subject of this work.  
 In order for collective bargaining arrangements to exist at sectoral level,65 
there are a number of LRA provisions parties must meet. These are all contained 
in sections 27 to 34 of the LRA.66  In summary this entails adopting a constitution 
in accordance with section 30; registration with the Registrar of Labour Relations 
(Department of Labour)67; defining the powers and functions of the bargaining 
council as spelt in section 28 of the act.  
 Insofar the status of collective agreements are concerned, agreements 
concluded in a bargaining council are binding on all employees and employers 
covered by the scope of the bargaining council. It furthermore has the effect of 
altering individual contracts of employment.68 Lastly, collective agreements 
                                                          
63
 Supra note 62 at para 13.  
64
 Centralised Bargaining does not only happen within bargaining councils. National Bargaining forums can 
be set up and regulated in terms of a recognition/collective agreement. See in this regard Godfrey & 
Bamu op cit note 12 at 231-232. 
65
 The term more commonly used in South Africa is centralised bargaining. 
66
 The provisions governing the establishment of the public sector bargaining council (PSCBC) and that of 
other forms of centralised bargaining, like statutory councils and the like is not dealt with here. Also, part 
F of the same chapter deals with general provisions concerning councils. That too is not dealt with here.  
67
 Section 27 of the LRA. Such registration must be in accordance with the provisions of section 29 of the 
act.  
68
 Section 23(3). See also Du Toit et al Chapter V at page 275. 
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concluded by parties to a bargaining council may be extended to non-parties 
operating under the registered scope of the bargaining council.69 This is however 
seen as a disincentive for trade unions to organise workers in unorganised 
workplaces70  
1.6 The South African Local Government Bargaining Council (SALGBC) 
The South African Local Government Bargaining Council (Salgbc) was formally 
established in 2001. Prior to the establishment of the Salgbc, collective bargaining 
were fragmented in that negotiations were mainly located at local level involving 
some 700 employers throughout the country.71 The South African Municipal 
Workers’ Union (Samwu) 1995 National Congress noted for example: 
 That we have experienced serious problems and frustrations in negotiations due 
 to the division of local government with major cities and small towns controlled by 
 different employer organisations with different political affiliations and ….. That a 
 central problem facing our union is that local government has not yet established 
 new Associations or Employers’ Organisations with the result that we will not 
 have bargaining in a more organised manner.72 
 
 Worse still, is the fact that conditions of employment (and indeed 
bargaining) were racially segregated resulting in Whites enjoying far superior 
wages and conditions of service measured against that earned by Black73 workers. 
These will be discussed below. 
1.6.1. Background of Collective Bargaining in the Municipal sector (disparate 
employment conditions) 
Black African workers, during the initial periods of collective bargaining in the local 
government sector, were not regarded as permanent employees and, as a 
consequence, there were no salary grades to the job they were performing. This 
was due to the segregated conditions of employment prevalent at the time. As 
Roger Ronnie74 points out: 
                                                          
69
 Section 32 of the LRA.  
70
Du Toit, D & Ronnie, R ‘The necessary evolution of strike law’ in le Roux, Rochelle & Rycroft, Alan (eds) 
Reinventing Labour Law (2012) 195-218 
71
 Fragmentation to Unification: The development of Collective Bargaining in Local Government, First 
Edition, 2011 at page 6. 
72
 Organised Local Government, Samwu National Congress resolution,  1995 
73
 The term Black is generically used to include ‘African’, ‘Coloured’ and ‘Indian’ workers.  
74
 Samwu General Secretary between 1994 till 2006. 
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 It was say around 1990 - 1991 that African workers became graded, especially in 
 the smaller towns and cities. The old “Van Der Merwe” Job Evaluation system 
 was extended to cover these workers and an extra couple of wage levels were 
 added into the corresponding wage structures. If I recall correctly it was about 
 five extra levels that then were used to accommodate the so-called “unskilled” 
 workers. Before that, besides not forming part of the grading structure, these 
 workers were also not seen as permanent employees. It was around about this 
 time that SAMWU joined the old Industrial Council. This contributed greatly to 
 changing the status of these workers and laying the base for future collective 
 bargaining in the sector including the realisation of a sector minimum.75 
 
 This became the driving force of Samwu to establish uniform wages and 
conditions of service for all municipal employees, irrespective of race and class 
classification. 
1.6.2. Parties to the Salgbc 
There are currently three parties to the Salgbc, the employers’ association, Salga, 
and the trade unions, Imatu and Samwu. Below I look at each of the parties, 
including their history and how they are constituted.  
 It is important to note here that the recognition of parties to the Salgbc is 
regulated by clause 4 of the Salgbc constitution. In terms of that provision, the 
parties to the council shall be the founding parties (Salga, Imatu and Samwu), any 
registered employers’ organisation representing at least fifteen per cent of the total 
number of employers within the scope of the council and any registered trade 
union representing at least fifteen per cent of employees within the registered 
scope of the council76. Thus, for example, should a registered trade union seek 
admission to the Salgbc it shall require of such trade union to have at least 33 282 
municipal employees as members of such union.  
1.6.2.1. South African Local Government Association (Salga) 
The employers’ association, Salga, was established in terms of the Organised 
Local Government Act.77 It is the representative and collective bargaining body of 
all 284 municipalities in the Republic.78 Whilst this may entitle Salga to enter into 
binding collective agreements on behalf of its members (municipalities) in 
                                                          
75
 Interview with Roger Ronnie, 12 December 2012.  
76
 Constitution of the South African Local Government Bargaining Council (2007) page 7. 
77
 Act 52 of 1997. This piece of legislation is in accordance with section 163 of the South African 
Constitution (1996).  
78
 Constitution of Salga. 
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accordance with the provisions of the LRA, there have been many instances 
where collective agreements were challenged by its constituent members. Of 
equal concern is the fact that collective agreements reached at centralised 
bargaining level, like wages, must first be ratified by individual Councils in terms of 
the Municipal Finance Management Act79 (MFMA). This is notwithstanding the 
provision of section 71 of the Municipal Systems Act80 which reads that 
‘Municipalities must comply with any collective agreements concluded by 
organised local government within its mandate on behalf of local government in 
the bargaining council established for municipalities’.  
 1.6.2.2. Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union (Imatu) 
The Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union (Imatu) was formed in 1996 
following the merger of the former South African Association of Municipal 
Employees (SAAME), the Johannesburg Municipal Employees Association 
(JMEA), National Union of Employees of Local Authorities (NUELA), Durban 
Municipal Employees Association (DMES) and the South African Local Authorities 
and Allied Workers Union (SALAAWU).81 The union has a reported membership 
base of 70 00082 members, inclusive of private sector employers. Imatu is not 
affiliated to a trade union federation after they disaffiliated from the Federation of 
Democratic Unions in South Africa (FEDUSA), a non-political aligned trade union 
federation on or about June 2012.  
1.6.2.3. South African Municipal Workers’ Union (Samwu) 
The South African Municipal Workers’ Union (Samwu) is the largest of the two 
trade union parties to the Salgbc. Samwu was formed in October 1987 following 
the unification of the Cape Town Municipal Workers Association (CTMWA), 
General and Allied Workers Union (GAWU), Municipal Workers Union of South 
Africa (MWUSA), South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) and the Transport 
and General Workers Union (TGWU). The Democratic Integrated Employees 
Society (DIMES) and the Union of Johannesburg Municipal Workers (UJMW) 
                                                          
79
 Act 56 of 2003. 
80
 Act 32 of 2000, as amended. 
81
 Op cit note 71 at 27. 
82 This figure was obtained from the Imatu website. Available at http://www.imatu.co.za/about-
imatu/mission-statement/ (Accessed on 11 December 2012). It is to be noted that the March 2011 Salgbc 
data reflect Imatu membership at 62 096.  
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joined Samwu later.83 The union’s current membership is 155 000, inclusive of 
private sector workers performing a municipal function84. Samwu is affiliated to the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) which in turn is in alliance 
with the ruling ANC.   
1.6.3. Municipal employment; union membership and wage levels 
What follows are data that illustrates the current level of employment within the 
municipal sector, the level of union organisation, in terms of membership, and the 
wage levels within the industry.  
Municipal Employment & Unionisation levels (March 2011)85 
                                                          
83
 Op cit note 71 at 26-27. 
84
 Secretariat report to the Samwu 10
th
 National Congress, Mangaung, 2012 
85 Salgbc Website. Available at 
http://www.salgbc.org.za/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=110&view=viewcategory&catid=2
59 (accessed on 27 November 2012) 
  
PROVINCES 
TOTAL 
EMPLOYEES SAMWU IMATU 
DUAL 
MEMBERS 
OTHER UNION 
MEMBERS NON UNION EMPLOYEES 
TOTAL NON-UNION 
EMPLOYEES 
KwaZulu Natal 39 779 21 962 15 301 1 866 9 2 507 2 516 
Eastern Cape 24 990 17 499 5 084 572 82 2 374 2 456 
Western Cape 42 346 22 032 15 286 21 269 4 759 5 028 
Northern Cape 7 202 5 464 953 - 2 802 804 
North West 10 685 7 797 2 077 37 25 786 811 
Mpumalanga 12 754 9 848 1 904 43 140 862 1 002 
Limpopo 11 507 8 825 2 002 1 62 618 680 
Free State 14 270 10 268 2 571 35 186 1 256 1 442 
Gauteng 58 349 36 600 16 918 1 441 351 4 480 4 831 
TOTAL 221 882 140 295 62 096 4 016 1 126 18 444 19 570 
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Municipal Employment & Unionisation levels Graph (March 2011)
 
 
Municipal employment per province (in per cent)  
 
 Jointly the two trade unions represent 91 per cent of total employment 
within the sector with Samwu at 63 per cent and Imatu at 28 per cent. This is a 
E/Cape F/State Gaut KZN Limpo Mpuma N/West N/Cape W/Cape
TOTAL EMPLOYEES 24 990 14 270 58 349 39 779 11 507 12 754 10 685 7 202 42 346
SAMWU 17 499 10 268 36 600 21 962 8 825 9 848 7 797 5 464 22 032
IMATU 5 084 2 571 16 918 15 301 2 002 1 904 2 077 953 15 286
DUAL MEMBERS 572 35 1 441 1 866 1 43 37 0 21
OTHER UNION MEMBERS 82 186 351 9 62 140 25 2 269
NON UNION EMPLOYEES 2 374 1 256 4 480 2 507 618 862 786 802 4 759
TOTAL NON-UNION EMPLOYEES 2 456 1 442 4 831 2 516 680 1 002 811 804 5 028
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very high per cent of union representation in an individual bargaining council 
compared to private sector centralised bargaining.86  
 
Wage levels in the local government sector87 
Minimum wages for the period 2002 – 2012 
 
Year  Minimum Wage  
2002 R 2100  
2003 R2321.13 
2004 R2517.64 
2005 R2668.69 
2006 R 2850/2907 
2007 R3093.92 
2008 R3350 
2009 R 3850 / R 4000 (1/01/10) 
2010 R4339 
2011 R4620 
2012 R4927 
 
 As can be seen from the above table, the minimum wage within the sector 
more than doubled over the last ten years. In per cent age terms, measured 
against inflation, the minimum wage rose by 335 per cent between 1997 and 2009 
whilst over the same period inflation rose by only 80 per cent.88 This can be 
attributed to the fact that the unions, in particular Samwu, tabled separate 
demands for salary adjustments (real wage increases) and an increase in the 
minimum wage. In many respects, an increase in the minimum wage resulted in a 
larger per cent increase for lower categories of workers.     
 
                                                          
86
 See in this regard Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining in South Africa: Past, present and future?  at pages 
118-119. 
87
 Collective Bargaining Report to the Samwu Central Executive Committee, October 2012.  
88
 Godfrey & Bamu op cit note 12 at 227. 
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Negotiated increases for the period 2002 – 2012 measured against inflation89 
 
 
Municipal Wage levels measured against other industries90 
 
Minimum Wage Across Sectors – 2011 
Food / Agriculture             R 2533    
Building / Construction      R 2612  
Transport / Freight            R 3626  
Communications               R 3800  
Retail / Catering                R 4390  
Municipal R 4927 
Food Manufacturing          R 5012  
                                                          
89
 Supra note 87. 
90
 Supra note 87. 
YEAR Percentage wage increase Inflation 
2002 8.5% 9.2% 
2003 10.53% 5.8% 
2004 7.85% 1.4% 
2005 6% 3.4% 
2006 7.5% 4.7% 
2007 6.43% 7.1% 
2008 8.3% 11.5% 
2009 13% 7.1% 
2010 8.48% 4.3% 
2011 6.08% 5.0% 
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Health / Education            R 5073   
Metal and Engineering      R 5380  
Finance                             R 6109  
Mining                               R 6476  
Chemical                           R 6723  
 
 The above data confirms that municipal wage rates are not ‘high’ if 
measured against other key sectors. It in fact is close to the median of the 
reported sectors. Also, a minimum wage should not be confused with a ‘living’ 
wage. Samwu defines a ‘living wage’ to be ‘concerned with whether or not a 
worker is able to earn sufficient income, in order to be able to afford for his or her 
family a minimum acceptable living standard’.91 It is worthy to note that none of the 
advocates of a living wage, most notably Cosatu and its affiliated unions, are yet to 
define the monetary value of a living wage.  
 There is an emergent school of thought globally that public sector unions 
are significantly better off than private sector unions. It is argued that the state, 
unlike private enterprise, is not profit driven and consequently able to offer higher 
wages and conditions without the fear of ‘going out of business’ or reducing staff 
complement to offset higher wages; that public sector unions effectively elect their 
public representatives and are thus able to exert political power over them; public 
sector unions can use their political power to demand expansion of the public 
service thus increasing their membership base and, effectively, the bargaining 
strength; organising in the public sector is much easier as the only employer is the 
local state thus ensuring regular stream of union financial resources, etc. It is 
noted that: 
 A further important advantage that public-sector unions have over their private-
 sector counterparts is their relative freedom from market forces. In the private 
 sector, the wage demands of union workers cannot exceed a certain threshold: if 
 they do, they can render their employers uncompetitive, threatening workers’ 
 long-term job security. In the public sector, though, government is the monopoly 
 provider of many services, eliminating any market pressures that might keep 
 unions’ demands in check. Moreover, unlike in the private sector, contract 
                                                          
91
 Samwu National Congress (2012) draft resolution.  
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 negotiations in the public sector are usually not highly adversarial; most 
 government-agency managers have little personal stake in such negotiations. 
 Unlike executives accountable to shareholders and corporate boards, 
 government managers generally get paid the same – and have the same 
 likelihood of keeping their jobs – regardless of whether their operations are run 
 efficiently. They therefore rarely play hardball with unions like business owners 
 and managers do; there is little history of “union busting” in government.92 
 
 Experiences in South Africa have been vastly different. The local 
government sector has experienced significant job losses, mainly due to 
privatisation of municipal services; wage rates are relatively moderate compared 
to other sectors of the economy; wage bargaining mostly gets resolved through 
power play; the relationship between trade unions and elected representatives is 
on a proverbial low and the sector is riddled with allegations of widespread 
corruption. The National Treasury noted that: 
 Personnel management in local government has been marred in many instances 
 by poor recruitment practices, political interference in the appointment and 
 dismissal of employees, the inability to attract and retain suitably qualified staff, 
 high vacancy rates and the lack of performance management systems and other 
 related symptoms…. While the total vacancy rate in metros has been 
 approximately 25 per cent since 2006, there are notable differences between 
 them. Tshwane reports a very high vacancy rate: from 48.3 per cent in 2006 it 
 increased to over 51 per cent in 2009. The increase correlates with the number of 
 jobs lost in this municipality since 2006. However, the level indicates that Tshwane 
 is currently operating with less than half of its approved positions filled.93 
 
 The relationship between the two trade unions is also not at the required 
level to challenge the employer in a concerted manner. The causes are suggested 
in this view: 
 There is no coordinated bargaining strategy between the trade unions which can 
 be attributed to a lack of trust and the parties’ respective view on strike action. It is 
 generally accepted that the ordinary Imatu member would rather want to see a 
                                                          
92
 National Affairs ‘The trouble with public sector unions, Daniel Disalvo, issue number 5, fall 2010. 
Available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-trouble-with-public-sector-unions 
(Accessed on 24 January 2013) 
93 National Treasury ‘Managing Municipal Personnel’, 2011. Available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/igfr/2011/lg/10.%20Personnel%202011%20LGBER%20-
%20Final%20-%209%20Sept%202011.pdf (Accessed on 25 January 2013). 
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 dispute resolved through litigation whereas Samwu would pursue strike action. It 
 has also not assisted with Samwu strikes turning violent.94  
 
 The outcome of the 2011 wage negotiations could have had a different 
result if Samwu persisted with their intended strike prior to the 2011 local 
government elections. As noted earlier, that strike was called off after the national 
leadership of the ANC met with the NEC of Samwu during which meeting the ANC 
leaders committed themselves to resolve the burning issues raised by Samwu, 
including the wage demands.95 Following the elections, the ANC reneged on those 
commitments. The union accordingly lost the leverage it had to demand a decent 
wage increase. This is indicative of the political relationship between the union and 
the ruling ANC.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
94
 Interview with Imatu Western Cape Regional Manager, Ettiene Bruwer, 24 January 2013. Some of the 
comments was made in his personal capacity and may not necessarily be the views of Imatu nationally. 
95
 See also Samwu press release titled ‘SAMWU National Strike suspended’, Tahir Sema, 10 May 2011. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Key features of the 2011 municipal strike 
 
This chapter shall illustrate the key features of the 2009 – 2012 wage and salary 
collective agreement concluded between the parties to the Salgbc, the unions 
demand that salary negotiations be re-opened consequential to the year on year 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) data, the legal challenge mounted by the employers’ 
association, Salga, the failed negotiation and mediation processes, the eventual 
strike action of, primarily Samwu, the nature of the strike and what may have 
informed that and finally, the strike outcome.  
 
2.1 The 2009 – 2012 Wage and Salary Collective Agreement 
Given that the 2006 – 2009 wage and salary collective agreement was to 
terminate at the end of June 2009, the trade unions parties submitted their joint 
proposals for the purposes of concluding a new wage and salary collective 
agreement. Key amongst their demands were a single year96 wage agreement, an 
across the board increase of twenty six per cent or R3 150 (whichever is the 
greater) for all employees falling under the registered scope of the SALGBC and a 
minimum wage of R6 500 per month.  
 Salga in turn tabled a counter offer of a three year wage and salary 
agreement with year one being six points two per cent, year two and three the 
average CPI plus nought point five per cent with no adjustment in the minimum 
wage.   
 After protracted negotiations which yielded no positive outcome, the trade 
unions gave notice of protected strike action on the 17th July 2009 with the strike to 
commence on the 27th July 2009.97 Strike action commenced on the 27th July 2009 
and lasted for five days.98 The outcome of the strike resulted in, amongst other, a 
                                                          
96
 The preceding wage agreement was for a three year period.  
97
 As has been the history of collective bargaining in the sector the 2002, 2005 and 2006 wage bargaining 
also resulted in national strike action.  
98
 “Municipal Workers call off strike”. Mail and Guardian online. Available at http://mg.co.za/article/2009-
07-31-municipal-workers-call-off-strike (Accessed on 04 December 2012). 
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thirteen per cent salary adjustment effective 01 July 2009, the second year, CPI 
plus one point five per cent, the third year, CPI plus 2 per cent, the minimum wage 
is adjusted to R3 850 effective 01 July 2009 and further adjusted to R4 000 as of 
the 1st of January 2010. 
 The agreement also provided that ‘should the average CPI be lower than 
5% or higher than 10% for the period referred to in clauses 6.2 and 6.3 above, any 
party may be entitled to re-open the negotiations.’ It was the interpretation and 
application of this clause which ultimately led to the 2011 strike. 
2.2 Re-opening substantive negotiations and the demand for an 18 per cent 
or R2 000 wage adjustment 
The three year salary and wage agreement reached in July 2009 should have 
meant that the municipal sector enjoy labour peace until 2012, at least insofar 
wage related strike action was concerned99. This was not to be the case. The LRA 
prohibits strike action during the currency of a collective agreement regulating the 
matter in dispute.100 
 The average CPI for the period 1 February 2010 until 31 January 2011101 
was lower than the threshold defined in clause 6.5102. Given this situation, the 
trade union parties resolved to re-open negotiations on the wage component of the 
collective agreement.  
 The unions subsequently tabled a wage demand for a salary adjustment of 
R2 600 or 18 per cent, whichever is the greater.103 This wage demand, in effect, 
was seeking a salary adjustment of more than four times the recorded CPI figure 
at the time. Forbes recalled that: 
 The wage demand was a not based on a particular formula. It was a spontaneous 
 response from members that was indicative of the material and socio-economic 
                                                          
99
 During 2010 Samwu went on strike over Salga’s refusal to agree on a Wage Curve Collective Agreement. 
That strike resulted in an agreement between the parties, including Imatu. The terms of that agreement 
are however the subject matter of court proceedings at the Labour Appeal Court following a favourable 
ruling to the unions in the Labour Court. 
100
 s 165(3)(a)(i). 
101
 Clause 6.3 of the salary and wage collective agreement (as so does clause 6.2) defines the period for 
which the average CPI needs to be determined that shall inform the actual per cent increase for the 
ensuing wage adjustment.  
102
 The actual CPI came out at 4.08.  
103
 The trade unions jointly submitted their wage demands on the 8
th
 April 2011. 
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 conditions they find themselves in. If viewed from the perspective of the ordinary 
 Samwu member, many of whom care for extended (unemployed) family members, 
 the monetary demand, in particular, reflected their needs to, at least, sustain their 
 existing means of livelihood. It cannot be argued that an average CPI calculation is 
 going to alleviate them from their poverty situation. After all, food inflation and the 
 cost of schooling for poor working people and the rest are much higher than for 
 rich people.104   
 
  Salga did not take kindly to the stance taken by the trade unions. As has 
been indicative of the volatile bargaining relationship between the parties, Salga 
elected to challenge the union’s right to re-open wage bargaining.  
2.3 The legal challenges 
Salga applied a different interpretation of clause 6.5 to that take  by the unions. In 
a circular to their member municipalities they stated that: 
 SALGA considered the demands from the trade unions and has the view, 
 supported by a legal opinion from four different law firms, that Salary and Wage 
 negotiations cannot be re-opened in terms of clause 6.5 of the existing salary and 
 wage agreement as the CPI for the period being 5.53% is neither below 5% or 
 above 10% for the period referred to in clause 6.2 and 6.3.105  
 
 The trade unions, on the other hand, contended that a literal interpretation 
of the  agreement entitled them o re-open wage bargaining. This, so they argued, 
is premised on the clear wording used in clause 6.5, that is, that clauses 6.2 and 
6.3 refers to two separat  periods for the calculation (and accordingly 
determination) of the salary adjustment and not, as Salga contended, that the two 
years combined constituted a single period.  
 
 Confronted with the two conflicting interpretations parties invoked the 
provisions of clause 15 of the wage agreement.106 Needless to say, parties could 
not reach agreement during the conciliation stage of the dispute. The matter was 
                                                          
104
 Interview with Dale Forbes, Samwu Collective Bargaining Officer, 12 December 2012. A press 
statement issued by the union on 11 April 2011 read ‘SAMWU’s wage demands have been informed by 
the increase in price of many basic necessities and the cost of day to day living.’ 
105
 Salga Circular 16/2011, Xolile George, Chief Executive Officer, 28 April 2011.  
106
 Clause 15 of the agreement provides for disputes relating to the Interpretation and Application of the 
collective agreement. In terms of that provision parties should seek to reach agreement via conciliation 
failing which the matter must be determined via arbitration.  
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accordingly set down for arbitration on the 21st June 2011.107 Ruling in favour of 
the unions the commissioner commented that the interpretation advanced by the 
employer’s body would lead to an absurdity if negotiations could only be re-
opened after one occasion, that is, after January 2011. He concluded that: 
 This would have meant that, if inflation reached an unexpected level after the 
 period specified in Clause 6.2, an inflation related increase would nevertheless 
 have to be implemented on 1 July 2010 but negotiations to bring an across the 
 board increase to more realistic levels would only be allowed later, when the CPI 
 figures for January 2011 became available. (The Respondents contend that this 
 would be 8 months later in approximately mid March 2011).108  
 
 The determination on whether negotiations could be re-opened or not is an 
important factor as the LRA does not permit parties to re-open negotiations or 
engage in strike action for the duration of an existing agreement.109  The 
favourable ruling to the trade unions thus created the legal ground to effectively 
compel the other bargaining party, Salga, to negotiate with them.  
 Over the same period that parties engaged in an Interpretation dispute, the 
trade unions lodged a mutual interest dispute alleging that Salga is unwilling to 
meet their wage demands. This matter came before the appointed commissioner 
who, incidentally, also conciliated the Interpretation dispute. His attempt to 
consolidate the two disputes into one was not well met by the parties. As such, the 
Interpretation dispute was arbitrated with the outcome detailed above. 
 Attempting to conciliate the mutual interest dispute, the conciliator 
attempted to identify the importance of mutual relations between the parties as 
bargaining adversaries with the aim of finding an interest based settlement. This 
he did by recommending a settlement offer that would take account of the factors 
and principles enshrined in the current wage agreement yet, if favourably 
considered, would lead to, in his opinion, a mutually acceptable resolution to the 
wage dispute. With that in mind he recommended that clause 6.3 of the wage 
agreement read that ‘All employees, except those employees excluded in clause 4 
above, shall receive for the financial year 2011/2011 (sic) with effect from 1 July 
                                                          
107
 The arbitration award appears under Salgbc case number HQ051115. 
108
 Paragraph 78 of the arbitration award. 
109
 S 65(3)(a)(i) of the LRA. See in this regard Cape Gate (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA & others [2007] 5 BLLR 436 
(LC).   
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2011 an across the board increase based on a notional CPI percentage of 5,5%, 
plus two (2%) percent.’  This recommendation would require the trade unions to 
move from their demand of 18 per cent of R2 000 and Salga from their 6.08% 
wage offer.  
 Neither the trade unions nor Salga accepted the recommendation of the 
conciliator. This is indicative of the historical bargaining relationship between the 
parties as opposed to seeking a mutual gain to negotiations. As John Brand points 
out: 
 The facilitator and the parties also need to be sensitive to a negotiation paradox. 
 On the one hand a mutual gain approach to negotiations is likely to deliver a 
 strong outcome, but the process of achieving this may be perceived to be weak by 
 the party’s principals. On the other hand a tough and militant adversarial stance 
 may appear to be strong to the principals but it usually delivers a weak outcome. 
 The facilitator and the parties need to manage this in a way which does result in a 
 strong outcome but without the representatives appearing to be weak. As 
 appreciation of the benefits of mutual gain negotiation is cascaded down into 
 organisations the problem is easier to manage.110 
 
 What appeared to be a sensible approach to resolve the wage impasse was 
out rightly dismissed ostensibly due to internal mandating principles. The logic of 
that rejection is baffling for if the CPI figure was 5 per cent neither party could re-
open negotiations and union members had to accept a 7 per cent wage 
adjustment. Commenting on the 7, 5 per cent settlement facilitator proposal, a 
Samwu press statement read: 
 After extensive consultation with members, The NEC resolved that the 7,5% did 
 not represent a meaningful wage increase to address the needs of municipal 
 members, their families and other dependent on their wages, amongst the 
 unemployed. We noted that inflation continues to show significant increases – the 
 June CPI figure rose by 0,4% above the May figure. Furthermore, inflation which 
 impacts on poorer sections of municipal workers is close to 8%, whilst transport 
 and electricity costs continue to shoot through the roof.111  
The stage was thus set for a tough round of negotiations between the parties.  
2.4 The negotiations 
                                                          
110 Brand, John, ‘STRIKE AVOIDANCE – HOW TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE STRIKE AVOIDANCE STRATEGY – 
paper presented  at the 23
rd
 Annual Labour Law Conference, Sandton, August 2010. 
111
 Samwu press release, Tahir Sema, Samwu National Media and Publicity Officer, 03 August 2011. 
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The trade unions, having dispensed with the potential legal impediment argued by 
Salga, now had further difficulty of convincing their bargaining adversary to reach 
a mutually acceptable wage agreement.  
 Salga on the other hand stuck to their belief that their 6.08% wage offer 
represented the terms of the existing wage agreement and, given lack of available 
funding, the best they could offer workers as an increase. It argued that; 
 Labour’s argument for a higher percentage is, amongst others, the current salary 
 trends in other sectors that recently had wage settlements with increases of 
 between 8% - 10.5% after a (sic) strikes running into weeks. SALGA’s view at that 
 Conciliation and now is that this need not be the basis for rejecting the 6.08% the 
 wage and salary agreement provides for. This is so, amongst others, for the 
 following non-exhaustive reasons: 
1. NUM, in mines, has rejected an 11% increase that was offered by Impala  
  Platinum (the world’s second largest platinum producer) on the minimum 
  wage as that will result in a minimum wage less than the R4500.00 they  
  demand. 
2. Ceppwawu, in the Petroleum /Chemical industry secured a new minimum  
  wage of R4400.00 after the strike. 
3. NUMSA in metal industry secured a minimum wage of lowest R3317.00  
  and R4500.00 after the strike and 8 – 10% increase. 
4. Public Service’s lowest paid employee is presently at R4193.00 with a  
  possibility of R4478.00 if 6.8% is implemented. However there is no  
  guarantee that it will be implemented. 
5. Local Government’s current minimum wage of R4339.00 for a category 1  
  (small) municipality and above that in higher municipal categories indicated 
  clearly that a minimum wage of R4602.82 after the implementation of the  
  6.08% is above all these other sector employers some of which are profit  
  making sectors.112 
Samwu in turn issued a press statement reaffirming that: 
 Our demand for an 18% increase across the board or R2000, whichever is greater, 
 is very necessary to meet the economic hardship that municipal workers suffer. It 
 is clear that the new SALGA councillors are no different from the old. They both 
 follow national government’s anti-working class policies of neo-liberalism. By this 
 they want to squeeze workers whilst promoting the interest of capitalists and, of 
 course, enriching themselves in the process. SALGA is attempting to use the new 
 Municipal Systems Amendment Act to hide behind. This Act provides that SALGA 
 has to consult with the Fiscal and Finance Commission before entering into a 
 negotiated agreement. We say consult all you like but we are the negotiating 
 partner.113  
 
                                                          
112
 Salga Circular 33/2011, Xolile George, Chief Executive Officer, 05 August 2011. 
113
 Samwu press release, Tahir Sema, Samwu National Media and Publicity Officer, 08 August 2011. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
40 
 
 
 
 This was certainly not the foundation needed to ensure that parties engage 
in constructive negotiations to ensure a collective agreement favourable to both 
parties. As it turned out, parties engaged in no formal and constructive 
negotiations at all. As Forbes recalled: 
 The most problematic part of the 2011 wage negotiations is the fact that we never 
 engaged in formal, structured negotiations as would be expected of negotiating 
 parties. Our time was consumed in legal processes to determine whether 
 negotiations would be permitted as opposed to seeking agreement on wages. 
 Salga was steadfast in their view that they would not be prepared to offer any 
 more than the 6.08% they offered. Naturally we rejected this offer which was 
 premised on a below 5% CPI plus the already agreed 2% over-and-above that. 
 This was simply not acceptable to our members. In the end the only engagement 
 between the parties happened during the mediation process whilst the strike was 
 already underway. In hindsight, even though we won the right to re-open wage 
 bargaining, in real terms there was no bargaining at all.114     
 
2.5 The mediation process  
Following the failure of the parties to engage in meaningful negotiations Samwu 
gave notice of strike action which commenced on the 15th August 2011. By the 
23rd August 2011 parties agreed to a mediation session with the hope to resolve 
the national strike action by Samwu members.  
 At the commencement of the mediation process Salga raised reservations 
about the potential of reaching agreement particularly as they already advised 
municipalities to implem nt the 6.08 per cent and, more importantly, the impact of 
the Samwu strike was minimal in terms of strike support.115 Notwithstanding that, 
they were prepared to engage in the mediation session as they are mindful of the 
fact that there is a relationship and that there is a need for sound relationship 
between the parties. If there were to be movement, Salga argued, it would only be 
based on fractional movement on the 6.08 per cent and must take account of the 
amendments to the Municipal Systems Act which places an obligation to consult 
the National Fiscal and Financial Commission and the Minister of Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA). Salga were thus entering the 
mediation session from a position of strength. 
                                                          
114
 Ibid no 110. 
115
 Interview with City of Cape Town official, 18 January 2013. Imatu gave notice to commence strike 
action on the 19
th
 August 2011 but by then have not called out their members on strike.  
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 The trade unions, facing the daunting task of seeking a wage settlement 
whilst at the same time not wanting to lose face with their constituent members, 
were more open to the mediation talks. This was understandable given that their 
members were not supporting the call for strike action.  
 After much wrangling between the parties the mediation process ended in a 
stalemate with both parties at the same position when they entered mediations. 
This after the trade unions rejected Salga’s final wage offer of 6.3 per cent and 
Salga rejecting the union’s final demand of 7.75 per cent.  
 It is to be noted that halfway through the mediation process the parties 
released the mediator arguing that they may be in a better position reaching 
settlement between them than having him around. This approach yielded no 
positive results as it would appear that neither party seriously considered the 
concerns expressed by the other. They in fact created no fertile ground to reach a 
potential settlement by engaging in positional bargaining with no consideration for 
the views of the other party.  On this John Brand notes that: 
 A major challenge for both the facilitator and the parties is to regularly stand back 
 from the total negotiation and to think about possible trades across issues.  Whilst 
 it is useful to work on issues in separate task teams, it is important to avoid being 
 trapped in issue silos.  Often if one party is prepared to address the other party’s 
 concerns on one issue, the other party may be prepared to do likewise on another 
 issue.  Particularly when distributive issues are being dealt with, one needs to seek 
 to “expand the pie” by addressing employer interests on the one hand and to 
 facilitate meeting employee distributive needs on the other.  It is therefore 
 necessary, at appropriate times, to break out of issue silos and to look for trades 
 between issues.116 
 
 The strike being in its second week, a failed mediation process, dogmatic 
bargaining strategies adopted by both parties, grandstanding via the media – a 
recipe for disaster. Andrew Levy comments that: 
 Unless the intervention takes place at a time when the parties have moved 
 sufficiently far along their respective concession and resistance curves, or have 
 modified their bargaining attitude ratio to the point where they are actively seeking 
 settlement, it is unlikely that conciliation will succeed.117  
 
                                                          
116
 Supra note 110. 
117
 Levy, A. (2012). Why are we having so many strikes? Understanding the current wave of Industrial 
action. The Dispute Resolution Digest 2012, 14.  
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2.6 The strike commences 
2.6.1 The level of support for the strike 
As mentioned above, Salga’s stance during the mediation process was partly 
informed by the poor level of support evident during the strike. Levy predicts that 
as low of 20 per cent of the workforce heeded the strike call. He attributes this to 
the fact that the municipal sector had the most number of strikes over the 
preceding three years and that workers simply did not want to lose more money. 
This I believe is too simplistic and economistic. Municipal workers, particularly 
members of Samwu, have always heeded the call for strike action, particularly 
when it concerns wage adjustments.  
 It cannot however be argued that the 2011 strike was not unique in the 
sense that there was widespread workers’ rejection for strike action. Strike 
statistics indicate that only 16 166 out of 208 539 municipal employees nationally 
supported the 2011 wage strike.118 This represents a paltry 7.75 per cent strike 
support. Some of the reasons for the poor level of support can be attributed to 
‘strike fatigue’119; strikes to advance ‘political’ agendas120; failure to secure an 
agreement on wage curve and categorisation after two weeks of strike action121 
and widely reported discontent within Samwu.122 This view was confirmed during 
an interview where it was acknowledged that: 
 Firstly, the most important aspect of the strike is that IMATU did not support the 
 strike due to the iolence caused by the previous SAMWU strike coupled with the 
                                                          
118
 Supra note 115. 
119
 As noted by Levy, the municipal sector had the most number of strikes over the preceding three year 
period. This should also include the 2005 and 2006 wage strike.  
120
 Samwu mobilised its members in May 2011 around demands against the new Municipal Systems Act. 
This strike, which was meant to start just prior to the Local Government elections, was averted at the 
eleventh hour after engagement with the ruling ANC. As much as the strike did not proceed, members 
were mobilised for strike action and it was felt that they were used as political pawns to achieve some 
concessions from the state. Worse, the ruling ANC later reneged on some of the commitments made to 
avert the strike action.  
121
 In April 2010 Samwu members engaged in strike action over a long outstanding wage curve and 
categorisation agreement. Following strike action, parties settled but the terms of the settlement 
agreement is still the subject matter of court proceedings. The resulting effect is that striking workers 
have not enjoyed the success of their two week strike action.  
122 See in this regard Sowetan Live. Available at http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2011/08/23/joburg-
not-backing-samwu-strike and http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2011/08/18/internal-row-hits-
samwu-strike (accessed on 19 December 2012).  
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 intimidation of their members when they chose to march. The second comment I 
 want to make is the strike was unsuccessful because SAMWU Gauteng did not 
 bring out their members and the employer knew that and used that strategically. 
 The third comment I want to make is that at a political level there was a general 
 feeling that the unions have sacrificed service delivery demands and the demands 
 of the community for better salaries and wages and that they would rather face 
 striking workers than disgruntled communities. So the timing of the strike was bad 
 and the demands were bad. The fourth comment is that the unions had no 
 appreciation for the international financial climate and their demands were over the 
 top, especially given the other financial matters being bargained, like TASK, the 
 wage curve, etc. So, within a declining financial market the wage demands of the 
 unions created a resistance with the employer. When the parties then engaged 
 each other even with Charles Nupen, Salga were upfront with the facilitator that 
 there was no money and that retrenchments were a reality. On the issue of the 
 implementation of the 6.08%, my understanding is, and I speak under correction, 
 this related to the previous multi terms agreement and that there was a 
 discrepancy in that agreement which resulted in a dispute. On the public service 
 issue, I think the unions were blind to the fact that the government sees the 3 tiers 
 as one and that negotiations from the employer’s side now is linked to that on the 
 public service (in terms of the one public service regime). As things stand now, 
 local government is out of sync with the public service and there has to be an 
 appreciation that there cannot be disparities across the sectors. This is the reality. 
 The amendments to the MSA were so designed that the relevant Ministers have to 
 be consulted first so that the issue of fiscal and monetary values can be 
 considered and applied. Therefore, before any negotiations, SALGA consults the 
 relevant Ministers. Increases across the various sectors will in future, and in my 
 view, mirror each other.123 
 
2.6.2 Violent protest 
Brand emphasises that the form of strike action is largely informed by the 
negotiating conduct of the bargaining parties. He asserts that: 
 Strike action can take two forms. The first is conventional, non violent strike action 
 which is preceded by good faith negotiation. The second is violent strike action 
 which is preceded by bad faith negotiation. It is conceivable for violent strike action 
 to follow good faith negotiation and peaceful strike action to follow bad faith 
 negotiation but these permutations are less common.124 
 
 Strike action in the South African context has historically been violent and 
indicative of the collective bargaining relations between the bargaining 
adversaries.125 There has, in effect, been no transition from the forms of strike 
                                                          
123
 Supra note 115.  
124
 Supra note 110. 
125
 For a more detailed account of South African strike/protest action see J F Myburgh SC ‘100 Years of 
Strike Law’ (2004) 25 ILJ 962; Puke Maserumule ‘A Perspective on Developments in Strike Law’ (2001) 22 
ILJ 45; M S M Brassey ‘The Dismissal of Strikers’ (1990) 11 ILJ 213; Jeremy Gauntlett SC & Owen Rogers 
‘When all else has failed: Illegal strikes, ultimatums and mass dismissals’ (1991) 12 ILJ 1171; Carole 
Cooper ‘Strikes in Essential Services’ (1994) 15 ILJ 903; Carole Cooper ‘Sympathy Strikes’ (1995) 16 ILJ 759; 
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action evident during the Apartheid era and now under a Constitutional state. This 
is largely due to the continued distrust between employers and trade unions 
particularly when there is a recognised and growing wage gap between the rich 
and poor.  
 The municipal sector is no different. The media has certainly not been 
sympathetic to Samwu strikes given high incidents of refuse being strewn onto the 
streets and set alight. To this Samwu responded by releasing a press statement 
which attempted to clarify the union’s position on trashing and, as it argued, the 
class character thereof.  
 Many of our members are invisible to the public. They clean the streets at night, 
 and gather in the trash that the public expects to be taken away, and often at great 
 human cost. Our members do the work that many of the commentators would 
 never dream of doing. Maybe the commentators and others should spend just one 
 shift with the City night cleaners and open their eyes to the appalling conditions 
 they have to endure. We collect dead animals and worse on the roadside, we 
 unblock sewers, we fix water pipes in the freezing cold, respond to emergencies 
 and much more besides. And yet the gap betwe n these vital workers and those 
 who are supposed to manage service delivery is as wide as it was under 
 apartheid. That is the reality. When a street cleaner upturns a rubbish bag, does it 
 not occur to journalists and commentators that this might be an act of defiance, of 
 for one being visible, of not being taken for granted? Part of any industrial action is 
 to make visible what it is that workers do, to force an awareness on the public of 
 the value of these workers, not just as producers of goods, but as human beings 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Clive Plasket ‘Industrial disputes and the offence of Intimidation’ (1990) 11 ILJ 669; Clive Plasket & Richard 
Spoor ‘The new offence of Intimidation’ (1991) 12 ILJ 747; Alan Rycroft ‘The Employer’s ‘Level of 
Tolerance’ in a lawful strike’ (1993) 14 ILJ 285; Kenneth Creamer ‘The meaning and implications of the 
inclusion in the Constitution of a right to strike and the exclusion of a lock-out right: Towards 
asymmetrical parity in the regulation of industrial action’ (1998) 19 ILJ 1; H M Seady & P S Benjamin ‘The 
right to strike and freedom of association: An international perspective’ (1990) 11 ILJ 439; Judy Parfitt 
‘Work-place ballots: Rules and procedures’ (1992) 13 ILJ 294; Andrew Levy ‘Can anybody hear me? The 
Audi Rule and the dismissal of unprocedural strikers’ (2010) 31 ILJ 825; I Moodley ‘The Key to Unlocking 
the 'Lock-out' (1990) 11 ILJ 1; H J Fabricius SC ‘The Dismissal of strikers: A New Value judgment? (1996) 17 
ILJ 611; J J Gauntlett & D F Smuts ‘Boycotts: The Limits of Lawfulness’ (1990) 11 ILJ 937; B Grant ‘Political 
Stayaways: The dismissal of participants’ (1990) 11 ILJ 944; John Grogan ‘Strike dismissals in the Public 
Sector’ (1991) 12 ILJ 1; Barry Jammy ‘Of Go-Slows and Fast Responses’ (1991) 12 ILJ 482; Colin Kahanovitz 
‘Secondary Strikes: When are they permissible?’ (2006) 27 ILJ 2026; A A Landman ‘No place to hide – A 
trade union’s liability for riot damage: A note on Garvis & others v SATAWU (2011) 32 ILJ 834; A A 
Landman ‘Protected industrial action and immunity from the consequences of economic duress’ (2001) 
22 ILJ 1509; A A Landman ‘A trade union’s delictual liability regarding its members: Jada & others v 
SAMWU (2000) 21 ILJ 101; Catherine O'Regan ‘Interdicts restraining strike action – implications of the 
Labour Amendment Act 83 of 1988’ (1988) 9 ILJ 959; Tiziano Treu ‘Strike Regulation and Job Security’ 
(1992) 13 ILJ 1053; Dr Bernd Waas ‘A comment on the South African law of strikes and lock-outs from a 
German perspective’ (1997) 18 ILJ 214 
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 who have lives, who have families to support, who have dreams. As a union we do 
 not condone this action, but we at least try and understand it.126   
 
 One element of the 2011 municipal strike that cannot be justified is the 
looting of small traders at the union’s Cape Town march.127 At that march, a small 
section of the striking workers (and presumably some criminal elements) looted 
some small traders operating within the centre of the Cape Town inner city. This 
prompted the City of Cape Town to apply for an interdict of the strike which was 
granted by the Labour Court.   
 It is a truism that the violence associated with the Cape Town strike had 
much to do with the fact that their counterparts in other parts of the country did not 
heed the call for strike action. Brand argues that such violence is ordinarily 
associated with die-hard supporters following dwindling levels of support for strike 
action. 
 The unions have generally found the strikes hard to sustain because it is difficult 
 for workers to lose pay for any protracted period in the South African situation and, 
 as support for a strike has waned, the violence has often tended to escalate as 
 die-hard supporters try to keep it alive. 
 
 Whilst the Samwu press release on the scattering of refuse is likened to the 
nature of the industry the engage in, and, as such understandable, looting, 
particularly of small scal  hawkers, cannot be condoned. As noted earlier, South 
Africa has a rich history of turbulent strike action.128 Whether that feature is likely 
to change in the foreseeable future remains to be seen.  
                                                          
126 Samwu press statement, 17 August 2011. See also the Times live at 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2011/08/17/samwu-strike-coverage-exaggerated (Accessed on 21 
January 2013).  
127
 See also the City of Cape Town press release on the violent strike action in the city centre. Available at 
www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/.../page71654  (Accessed on 21 January 2013). 
128 See in this regard W Bendix, P Bibb, J Ibbotson ‘The 1987 SATS Strike: An IR Institutional Environmental 
Perspective’ (1988) South African Journal of Industrial Relations; G Simpson ‘Murder on the Mines: Who is 
guilty?’ (1989) South African Labour Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 3; S Meer and A Sitas ‘Conflict – in the 
community and in the factories’ (1989) SALB Vol 13 No 4/5; D Dison Violence and the Law: An 
examination of some recent trials. Paper presented at the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation, Seminar No. 9, 26 October1989; E Webster & G Simpson ‘Crossing the Picket Line: Violence 
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2.6.3 Internal union discontent 
Whilst Levy dismisses the idea that the Samwu strike was a failure due to internal 
union discontent, it was indeed a major factor. A significant number of the Samwu 
membership is based in Gauteng and Kwazulu Natal with 50 786 and 
25 070 members respectively.129 It is therefore not surprising that with the 
Gauteng membership not supporting the strike action and only 8 per cent on strike 
in Kwazulu Natal, it would be a failure. So too has been the case with other parts 
of the country where strike support has been poor.  
 The table below details the Samwu metropolitan membership as at May 
2011. The purpose of presenting this data is to illustrate that unless you have all of 
the bigger metros supporting strike action it is doomed to fail.130  
 
METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY SAMWU MEMBERS MAY 2011 
CAPE TOWN METRO (WESTERN CAPE) 12 570 
EKURHULENI METRO (GAUTENG) 10 337 
ETHEKWINI METRO  (KZN) 10 036 
JOHANNESBURG METRO (GAUTENG)              13 566 
MANGAUNG (FREE STATE)           2 408 
                                                                                                                                                                            
in industrial conflict -the case of the Afcol strike’ (1990) Industrial Relations Journal of South Africa, 11, No. 
4; J Joffe ‘Violence and the Law in the 1989 Railway Strike’ Paper presented at the Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation, Seminar No. 2, 25 April 1990; L Segal & G Simpson ‘Off the Rails: Violence in 
the Railway Strike of 1987’ Paper presented at ASSA conference, July 1990; Andrew M Colman ‘Crowd 
psychology in South African murder trials’ American Psychologist (1991) Vol 46(10)1071-1079; G Simpson 
Violence and Social Change: Some effects on the workplace and some possible solutions. Paper presented 
to the National EAP Committee of the Institute for Personnel Management Conference The Role of the 
EAP in Managing Trauma, Johannesburg, August 1991; G Simpson & L Vogelman ‘Overcoming Violence: 
The role of business’ The Innes Labour Brief, Special Brief, October 1992; K Von Holdt ‘Alusaf: violence and 
racism in Northern Natal’ (1993) SALB Vol 17 No 3 Jun; G Simpson ‘Business and Endemic Violence in 
South Africa: Surviving the disaster or managing the transition?’ Paper presented at The 6th South African 
Disaster Recovery Conference, Midrand, 16 - 17 March 1994; 
129
 Secretariat report, Samwu 10
th
 National Congress, August 2012.  
130
 Metropolitan Councils (category A municipalities) are located in larger towns or cities. Unlike Local 
Councils and District municipalities, they perform all the Constitutionally defined local government 
functions.  
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NELSON MANDELA METRO  (EASTERN CAPE)          4 544 
TSHWANE METRO (GAUTENG)        9 636 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
 
 Whilst the reasons for the strike boycott are not clear cut, reports suggest 
that it includes allegations of theft of union finances and infighting amongst the 
provincial leadership to members taking issue with the union president signing an 
altered agreement resulting in no gain to members following strike action the 
previous year.131 
 To make matters worse, the Cape Town strike, which was well supported at 
the start, lost momentum not because workers did not rally behind the wage 
demands but rather due to poor support in other parts of the country. This cannot 
bode well for a union whose slogan is ‘An Injury to one is an Injury to All’. The 
Samwu Western Cape provincial secretary noted that; 
 We had great difficulty convincing members to maintain the level of strike action 
 evident during the first few days. Media reports of the strike boycott in other parts 
 had members questioning why they should strike for others. As one member said, 
 ‘Why must we strike when members in Joburg are working’?132 
 
                                                          
131
 Supra note 122.  
132
 Interview with Samwu Western Cape Provincial Secretary, Andre Adams, 12 December 2012.  
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2.6.4 The strike outcome 
 Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of 2011 was a strike called in the 
 municipal sector by SAMWU. It was a complete failure. At no stage did 
 more than 20 per cent of the workforce heed the strike call, and in most 
 cases, the call was rejected totally. There have not been many strikes in the 
 recent history of South African labour that have failed as dismally.133  
 
With such a commentary it is hardly surprising that the media, particularly labour 
economists, like Levy, had a field day ridiculing Samwu for what they believed was 
a ridiculous wage demand to start with. The union leadership certainly did not 
strengthen their internal support base with members being on strike for over two 
weeks without being able to force Salga to move from their initial offer of 6.08 per 
cent. As the City of Cape Town interviewee commented, ‘SAMWU Gauteng did 
not bring out their members and the employer knew that and used that 
strategically’.134   
 What is most surprising is the fact that the national leadership of Samwu 
misread the preparedness of their members to engage in strike action. Surely the 
mood of members had to be known to them given that the unions tabled their 
wage demands in April 2011 and the strike only commenced in August 2011. 
Apart from the Cape Town strike, the national support for strike action was dismal. 
There is a view that given the poor level of support during the strike that the 
provincial leadership to the NEC misled the national body about their members’ 
preparedness for strike action. Whether that means that leadership has lost touch 
with their constituent members is a debatable issue.  
 Of equal concern is the fragile relationship between the bargaining parties, 
the trade unions and Salga, and between the trade unions themselves. The 
relations between the latter is fragile primarily because of Imatu’s consistent lack 
or poor showing during strike action thereby relying on the strength of Samwu 
members to gain wage demands. The relations between the trade unions and 
                                                          
133
 Op cit note 117 at 16. See also 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=X&q=http://dailymaverick.co.za/article/2011-08-28-how-not-to-strike-
for-dummies-samwu- 
edition&ct=ga&cad=CAcQARgAIAEoBDAAOABAlpHy8gRIAVgAYgJlbg&cd=wvAHxTsBwmA&usg=AFQjCNFSr
5Ctte29Zj8nDlc9UKTPESqy7Q (Accessed on 21 January 2013). 
134
 Supra note 115. 
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Salga continues to be fragile because parties are unable to engage in meaningful 
negotiations in the interest of building sound ongoing relations informed by mutual 
gain for both. Whether that is to change remains to be seen.   
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CHAPTER 3 
Analysing the strike 
 
Positional bargaining: the trade unions demand and the employer’s offer – 
doomed from the onset? 
 When negotiators bargain over positions, they tend to lock themselves into those 
 positions. The more you clarify your position and defend it against attack, the more 
 committed you become to it. The more you try to convince the other side of the 
 impossibility of changing your opening position, the more difficult it becomes to do 
 so. Your ego becomes identified with your position. You now have a new interest 
 in “saving face” – in reconciling future action with past positions – making it less 
 and less likely that any agreement will wisely reconcile the parties’ original 
 interest.135    
 
All of what is said by Fisher and Ury is indicative of the 2011 wage bargaining 
between the unions and Salga. The trade unions, most notably Samwu, even at 
the time of needing to accept a dismal strike f ilure and after failed negotiations, 
reverted back to their original wage demand of 18 per cent. This demand, Samwu 
argued, would be further explored with Salga. Needless to say, that never 
happened. 
 Salga, on the other hand, maintained what should be regarded as their 
principled position throughout the negotiations process – no form of movement 
whatsoever. They were prepared to sustain a three week long strike without 
making any concession. Their bargaining leverage, so to say, was the fact that 
Samwu was not well mobilised for strike action. Both these positional bargaining 
postures may have been driven by egos when measured against their media 
statements.   
 The wage demand of the trade unions was clearly not for an 18 per cent 
wage increase. Had that been the case Samwu would not have released a press 
                                                          
135 Fisher, Roger, and William Ury, with Bruce Patton, ed. Getting to Yes: Negotiating An Agreement 
Without Giving In. Second edition. New York: Penguin Books, 1991 at page 5.  
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statement barely a week into the strike that the union was holding out for a double 
digit wage increase and would be prepared to move from their 18 per cent demand 
if Salga moved from their offer of 6.08 per cent. The 18 per cent demand was 
therefore used as an inducement to get Salga to improve on their wage offer.  
 To make matters worse, both parties failed to consider any form of 
settlement consideration during the conciliation process or the mediation. It is 
doubted that the two experienced facilitators would have induced settlement 
between the disputing parties given their positions adopted. In hindsight, if the 
unions had done a proper assessment on the state of their members to pursue 
strike action, the recommendation of Professor Rycroft would have been accepted, 
at least by the trade unions. There would have been greater ease to justify a 7.5 
per cent wage settlement than to justify no improved offer from the employer.  
 Wage bargaining in the recent period has been pegged against the CPI 
over the preceding twelve months which usually gives an indication of future 
spending patterns. Unions have accordingly aligned their wage demands with the 
prevailing CPI at the time of wage bargaining. Thus, if CPI over the last twelve 
months was, for example, 5 per cent, and it is estimated that CPI is likely to grow 
by 2 per cent over the next twelve months, ie a total of 7 per cent, than in order to 
secure members with a means to sustain themselves, unions must, at least, settle 
on an improvement on the 7 per cent CPI estimation. This would mean that any 
settlement lower than 7 per cent would mean a deflationary increase and, as such, 
setting workers aback financially.  
3.2 Can there be an ongoing relationship between the bargaining parties?  
Institutionally, the trade unions and Salga will continue to engage in collective 
bargaining under the Salgbc. Whether that institutional relationship will equate to 
healthy working relations remain to be seen.  
 The choice of the collective bargaining relationship and, inherent therein, 
the ability to reach mutually acceptable settlements is ultimately determined by the 
negotiating parties. It is noted that; 
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 Several approaches to negotiation have been proposed in the literature. In their 
 classic work on the subject, Walton and McKersie (1965) identified four 
 subprocesses in labour-management negotiations: 
 distributive bargaining through which pure conflicts of interest are resolved; 
 integrative bargaining through which parties solve common problems and  
  seek complementary interest; 
 attitudinal restructuring whereby parties seek to influence each other’s  
  attitudes and adjust the basic bonds which relate them; 
 intra-organisational bargaining through which each side attempts to reach 
  an internal consensus. 
 These distinctions are reflected also in the positional bargaining on the merits 
 debate so eloquently led by Fisher, Ury, Brown, Goldberg, and their colleagues. 
 An important factor underlying choice of approach to negotiation lies in the extent 
 to which parties are concerned about their own and each other’s outcomes - in a 
 sense, whether they are concerned only about how much they can achieve for 
 themselves out of the exchange, or whether they also have concerns about the 
 relationship, and the extent to which other parties’ needs might be met for 
 purposes of nurturing positive longer-term ties.136 
 
 The Imatu interviewee pointed out that fundamental to the poor relations 
between the bargaining parties is a total lack of trust. He stated that unless the 
trust relationship is built, collective bargaining in the sector is likely to suffer. That 
may require of the bargaining parties to operate independent of the trust 
relationship for collective bargaining to succeed.  
 At the core of human relationships is a fragile interpersonal dynamic: trust. With 
 trust, deals get done. Without it, deals are harder to negotiate, more difficult to 
 implement, and vulnerable to changing incentives and circumstances. What is the 
 secret to creating and sustaining trust in negotiation? A simple but sturdy norm in 
 human behaviour: the norm of reciprocity.137   
 
 Having said that, the working relationship between the parties  suffered a 
set-back when Salga gave notice to terminate the Main Collective Agreement of 
the Salgbc. They served notice138 on the Salgbc on 21 May 2012 that the terms of 
the collective agreement shall lapse on the 1st July 2012. The effect of such a 
notice of termination means that all collective agreements, levels of bargaining, 
                                                          
136
 Anstey, Mark Managing Change negotiating conclict. Third edition, Juta Cape Town (2008). 
137
 Fisher, Roger, and William Ury, with Bruce Patton, ed. Getting to Yes: Negotiating An Agreement 
Without Giving In. Second edition. New York: Penguin Books, 1991 at page 59. 
138
 This was done in compliance with section 23(4) of the LRA. That section reads that “Unless the 
collective agreement provides otherwise, any party to a collective agreement that is concluded for an 
indefinite period may terminate the agreement by giving reasonable notice in writing to the other 
parties”. 
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dispute resolution mechanisms and the like will be of no legal effect after the 
termination date.    
 The unions challenged this notice of termination arguing that given the 
nature of the Main collective agreement a notice period shorter than twelve 
months would be unreasonable and as such invalid and that, in any event, the 
terms of the Salgbc collective agreements on members’ employment conditions 
are protected by section 23(3) of the LRA.139 Salga’s notice of termination became 
the subject matter of wage bargaining in 2012 where it was agreed that parties 
shall continue to engage in further bargaining to amend the current main collective 
agreement. This had to be concluded by the 31st December 2012.140 Negotiations 
are however ongoing on a new main collective agreement.  
 The above is indicative of the bargaining relationship between the two 
parties. As has been evident during the failed wage bargaining, much of that was 
preceded by litigation between the parties and less or no interest based 
bargaining. Salga, in 2003, also threatened to withdraw from the Salgbc. Given 
that the South African system of collective bargaining is premised on 
voluntarism141, regard must be had for the continued existence of a bargaining 
relationship in the sector. This will require of the bargaining parties, in the words of 
Ury et al to ‘show reciprocity’.  
3.3 Is there such a thing as good faith bargaining? 
                                                          
139 Section 23(3) of the LRA reads “Where applicable, a collective agreement varies any contract of 
employment between an employee and employer who are both bound by the collective agreement”. This 
means that the ‘old’ conditions of employment shall continue to be enjoyed by existing employees within 
the registered scope of the Salgbc. The case authority on the application of section 23(3) is to be found in 
SOUTH AFRICAN MARITIME SAFETY AUTHORITY v McKENZIE 2010 (3) SA 601 (SCA).  
140
 Clause 11.2 of the 2012 – 2015 Salary and Wage collective agreement reads “… the parties have until 
31 December 2012 to conclude a new collective agreement referred to herein”. A literal interpretation 
could have the resulting effect that should no collective agreement be reached, the Main Collective 
agreement lapses. As at 29
th
 January 2013, parties are continuing to negotiate a new agreement.  
141
 For a commentary on the voluntarism system of collective bargaining in South Africa see S Godfrey, J 
Maree, D Du Toit & J Theron Collective Bargaining in South Africa: Past, present and future? (2010) Juta, 
Cape Town at pages 89-90. See also Godfrey & Bamu op cit note 12 at 219-220. 
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The South African constitution recognises the right to engage in collective 
bargaining.142 What is not defined either in the constitution or the enabling 
legislation (LRA) is how the bargaining parties must conduct themselves. The LRA 
however requires of the bargaining parties to promote orderly collective 
bargaining.143  As much as ‘orderly’ collective bargaining is not defined it 
presupposes that parties should bargain rationally and focusing on issues as 
opposed to individuals.  
 The LRA, unlike the 1956 act, places no obligation on the bargaining parties 
to negotiate in good faith. Even if the current act prescribed good faith bargaining, 
I doubt that, in the South African context, such a concept would have succeeded. 
Rycroft, commenting on a draft Bill seeking to amend the 1956 LRA, notes that: 
 For those who believe collective bargaining should be a no-holds-barred exercise, 
 the requirement of acting reasonably will be regarded as a harmful fiction.  It has 
 even been suggested that 'good faith' is not part of the bargaining process and is, 
 in fact, impossible of attainment under the conditions of a capitalist economic 
 system. Yet the legal requirement of good faith bargaining in many jurisdictions 
 has meant that courts have had to come to terms with the reality of the power 
 struggle involved in collective bargaining.  It has, for example, been accepted in 
 Ontario that 'hard bargaining, albeit ruthless, is not bad faith bargaining144 
 
 South African politics are rooted in class politics. This has led to there being 
an inherent and historical context within which wage bargaining took place.145 
Many of those characteristics continue to be evident in a Constitutional 
democracy. Thus, even though Samwu is affiliated to Cosatu with the latter being 
in Alliance with the ruling ANC, that has not translated into harmonious working 
relationship between Samwu and Salga which, as has been pointed out, is 
impaired with trust issues. To that extent, the 2009 Samwu national congress 
noted that: 
 Salga represents the petit-bourgeois or middle class and has consistently followed 
 the bourgeoisie’s neo-liberal programme, Gear. A capitalist agenda is transmitted 
                                                          
142
 Section 23(5). It is to be noted that the right to engage in collective bargaining cannot be equated with a 
duty to bargain. See in this regard SANDU v Minister of Defence & others; Minister of Defence & others v 
SANDU (2006) 27 ILJ 2276 (SCA). 
143
 Section 1(d)(i) 
144 Rycroft, Alan The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith (1988) 9 ILJ 202. 
145
 For a detailed commentary see S Godfrey, J Maree, D Du Toit & J Theron Collective Bargaining in South 
Africa: Past, present and future? (2010) Juta, Cape Town.  
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 through SALGA from the ANC and generally follows the 1996 class project’s 
 leadership style.146  
 
 Given the ideological differences between, in particular Samwu, and their 
bargaining adversary, Salga, it is questionable whether they are indeed able to 
establish a harmonious bargaining arrangement. They are at opposite poles 
around matters such a privatisation, commercialisation of the sector and the 
manner local government is run. Critical in all of this is the wage gap within the 
sector where many municipal managers earn millions per year in poor performing 
municipalities.147 As one Samwu press statement read: 
 SAMWU notes with concern that Municipal Managers earn far in access of high 
 ranking politicians. What is more worrying to us, is that while Municipal Managers 
 get paid exorbitant salaries, workers are time and time again refused a decent 
 living wage in the form of annual wage increases and more equitable wage curves. 
 It is worrying that Municipal Managers of six of South Africa’s cities all earn more 
 than their political bosses, this is before the huge increases they stand to receive 
 in July this year. Tshwane city manager Jason Ngobeni and his Johannesburg 
 counterpart, Trevor Fowler, after the absurd increases of about 20% being 
 proposed, now stand to earn R3.25m and R3.23m a year from 1 July 2012.  
 It is ridiculous that these managers get paid millions, even though the 
 Municipalities they work for are plagued with corruption, nepotism, crisis and the 
 poor delivery of services.  
 President Zuma earns about R2.5m a year, Deputy President Motlanthe about 
 R2.2m and Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng is paid R2.23m a year. 
 The severity of the challenges faced by many Municipalities warrants many of 
 these managers to be sacked, let alone receive handsome remunerations and 
 performance bonuses.    
 Once workers learn that their city manager receives such hefty salaries, we can 
 expect nothing less than outrage, given that in some Municipalities, the lowest paid 
 workers get paid as little as R3000 per month.148 
  
3.4 Collective bargaining and the law. A look at key LRA sections 
3.4.1 Disclosure of Information (s 16) and Consultation (s 189(6)) 
                                                          
146
 Samwu National Congress, 2009, Collective Bargaining resolutions, Bela Bela, Limpopo.   
147
 It could be argued that the wage gap is greater in the private sector. That may well be so but the local 
government sector is unique in that even at poor performing municipalities, municipal managers continue 
to earn exorbitant salaries. 
148
 Samwu press release, Samwu National Media and Publicity Officer, 28 May 2012.  
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Disclosure of information for the purposes of collective bargaining is regulated by 
section 16 of the LRA.149 To rely on the provisions of section 16 of the LRA, a 
                                                          
149 That section reads;  
(1) For the purposes of this section, "representative trade union" means a registered trade union, or 
two or more registered trade unions acting jointly, that have as members the majority of the 
employees employed by an employer in a workplace.  
(2)  Subject to subsection (5), an employer must disclose to a trade union representative all relevant 
information that will allow the trade union representative to perform effectively the functions 
referred to in section 14(4).  
(3)  Subject to subsection (5), whenever an employer is consulting or bargaining with a 
representative trade union, the employer must disclose to the representative trade union all 
relevant information that will allow the representative trade union to engage effectively in 
consultation or collective bargaining.  
(4)  The employer must notify the trade union representative or the representative trade union in 
writing if any information disclosed in terms of subsection (2) or (3) is confidential.  
(5)  An employer is not required to disclose information-  
(a)  that is legally privileged;  
(b)  that the employer cannot disclose without contravening a prohibition imposed on the 
employer by any law or order f any court;  
(c)  that is confidential and, if disclosed, may cause substantial harm to an employee or the 
employer; or  
(d)  that is private personal information relating to an employee, unless that employee 
consents to the disclosure of that information.  
(6)  If there is a dispute about what information is required to be disclosed in terms of this section, 
any party to the dispute may refer the dispute in writing to the Commission.  
(7)  The party who refers the dispute to the Commission must satisfy it that a copy of the referral has 
been served on all the other parties to the dispute.  
(8)  The Commission must attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation.  
(9)  If the dispute remains unresolved, any party to the dispute may request that the dispute be 
resolved through arbitration.  
(10)  In any dispute about the disclosure of information contemplated in subsection (6), the 
commissioner must first decide whether or not the information is relevant.  
(11)  If the commissioner decides that the information is relevant and if it is information contemplated 
in subsection (5)(c) or (d), the commissioner must balance the harm that the disclosure is likely 
to cause to an employee or employer against the harm that the failure to disclose the 
information is likely to cause to the ability of a trade union representative to perform effectively 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
57 
 
 
 
trade union (or trade unions acting jointly), must demonstrate that they are the 
recognised collective bargaining agents and that the information sought will 
advance effective and transparent negotiations between the parties.  
 Failure to disclose must be for reasons set out in s16 (5) of the act. 
Disputes of this nature fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission for 
Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA).  
 The application of this LRA provision, I argue, is premised on bargaining 
parties having a degree of trust between them. If there is no trust relationship an 
employer is less likely to disclose information the trade union(s) is likely to use 
against it. The municipal sector is one such case in point where some information 
like, for example, the actual remuneration of senior management and that of 
Councillors could be used to justify higher wage demands for lower category 
employees.150 This will similarly be the case where the trade unions demand 
information relevant to outsourced services, municipal revenue generation etc in 
order to counteract, for example, the outsourcing of such services.  
 As the Imatu interview pointed out, there is no trust relationship between 
the parties and this has caused major obstacles in the collective bargaining arena. 
This view is shared by the Samwu staff interviewed. Perhaps more strikingly, the 
bargaining patterns, that of power play to induce agreement, has been the order of 
the day within the Salgbc almost on an annual basis.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
the functions referred to in section 14(4) or the ability of a representative trade union to engage 
effectively in consultation or collective bargaining.  
(12)  If the commissioner decides that the balance of harm favours the disclosure of the information, 
the commissioner may order the disclosure of the information on terms designed to limit the 
harm likely to be caused to the employee or employer.  
(13)  When making an order in terms of subsection (I 2), the commissioner must take into account any 
breach of confidentiality in respect of information disclosed in terms of this section at that 
workplace and may refuse to order the disclosure of the information or any other confidential 
information which might otherwise be disclosed for a period specified in the arbitration award.  
(14)  In any dispute about an alleged breach of confidentiality, the commissioner may order that the 
right to disclosure of information in that workplace be withdrawn for a period specified in the 
arbitration award.  
 
150
 Supra note 148. 
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 If there had been a genuine attempt on the side of both parties to engage in 
meaningful negotiations principled on good faith bargaining, the 2011 wage 
negotiations (or any negotiations for that matter), may have had a different 
outcome. It is however debateable whether good faith bargaining is the driving 
force behind meaningful negotiations.  
 The City of Cape Town official interviewed never suggested that Salga 
could not afford a wage adjustment higher than 6.08 per cent. He pointed out that 
Salga had knowledge that the Gauteng province of Samwu did not support the 
strike; they viewed their position as principled given the existence of a multi-year 
agreement and the fact that local government wage bargaining had to be brought 
in line with that of the public sector. Disclosure of information I believe would not 
have moved Salga from their principled position adopted.  
 The same would apply to the trade unions. Their wage demand for an 18 
per cent or R2000 salary adjustment must be measured against the declared CPI 
figure over the agreed period.151 The unions would have had great difficulty 
gaining public support knowing full well that the declared CPI was 4.08 per cent. 
Worse still, Samwu issued a press release stating that their real mandate is clearly 
not for an 18 per cent but rather a double digit increase. This is not the hallmarks 
of a trust relationship where, as bargaining parties, they are able to sit around the 
table to negotiate an interest gain wage agreement. Disclosure is indicative of a 
mutual gain relationship and not the other way around.     
 I will argue that the same line of argument applies for the purposes of 
consultation as envisaged by section 189(6) of the act. It is however worthwhile to 
note how the scheme of the LRA is meant to operate in the following commentary:   
 
 It is trite law that s 189 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) imposes on 
 employers three main duties prior to retrenchment: to consult, to make disclosure, 
 and to attempt to reach consensus on a variety of issues. These duties are closely 
 intertwined: without disclosure, consultation is uninformed, making consensus 
 difficult to achieve… This consultation process is meant to be a rational process. 
 As s 189(5) and (6) puts it, the employer must allow the other consulting party an 
 opportunity during consultation to make representations about any matter on which 
 they are consulting. The employer must consider and respond to the 
                                                          
151
 As pointed out earlier, trade unions use the CPI data as a measurement to determine wage demands.  
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 representations made by the other consulting party and, if the employer does not 
 agree with them, the employer must state the reasons for disagreeing.152 
 
3.5 At what stage do you settle? The concept of ‘ripeness to settle’ 
At what stage is settlement most likely? The concept of ‘ripeness to settle’ is 
defined as; 
 “Ripeness” describes the conditions under which efforts to resolve conflict appear 
 to be timely, and recognizes the cyclical character of conflict with its ebbs and 
 flows and peaks and troughs. Much of the scholarly writing on ripeness suggest 
 that the most likely circumstances for effective intervention towards settlement is 
 when there is a “hurting stalemate” between the parties, where each party is 
 trapped without obvious options for escaping or avoiding the conflict. Hurting 
 stalemate provides an incentive for the parties to ask themselves what they want 
 and need out of this conflict and how they can take the necessary steps to reduce 
 the negative impact of the dispute on their lives, their businesses, their reputations, 
 and their long-term plans. Parties who find themselves in a hurting stalemate are 
 motivated to settle, but they are also resentful and bitter, and negotiations are 
 often very acrimonious.153 
 
 Inherent in the ‘ripeness’ concept is a preparedness on both parties to 
reach settlement either between themselves or via a conciliated/mediated process. 
The 2011 municipal wage bargaining never reached the stage where both parties 
had ‘a shared perception of the desirability of a compromise’. Had that been the 
case, Salga would have moved from their original offer of 6.08 per cent following 
strike action.  
 Strike action in itself ordinarily induces a ‘ripe’ situation to settle as a means 
to minimise conflict which could harm relations and the image of the bargaining 
parties. That is if your strike action is effective. As was evident, Salga had a 
                                                          
152
  Rycroft, Alan ‘Pre-Retrenchment Disclosure? Well, Maybe Not... Robinson & Others v 
Pricewaterhousecoopers(2006) 27 ILJ 836 (LC)Chester Wholesale Meats (Pty) Ltd v Niwusa(2006) 27 ILJ 
915 (LAC) (2006) 27 ILJ 2014. 
153 Julie Macfarlane ‘Why Do People Settle’ (2001) 46 McGill L.J. 663 at 710. See also Marieke Kleiboer 
‘Ripeness of Conflict: A Fruitful Notion?’ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Feb., 1994), pp. 109-
116; William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (2ed 1989); Landon E. 
Hancock ‘To Act or Wait: A Two-Stage View of Ripeness’ International Studies Perspectives (2001) 2, 195–
205; Dean G. Pruitt ‘Whither Ripeness Theory?’ Working Paper No. 25, Institute for Conflict Analysis and 
Resolution, George Mason University. 
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knowledgably understanding of the organisational challenges Samwu were facing 
and were prepared to weather strike action.   
 Samwu’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)154 was to 
engage in strike action to force a settlement with Salga. When this yielded no 
positive results, they (and Imatu) opted to walk away from the bargaining table 
without concluding any collective agreement. Salga effectively had all the leverage 
to determine the bargaining outcome.   
 As stated earlier, the concept of ‘ripeness’ require both parties to seek a 
settlement to resolve their dispute. Where one party has far greater leverage over 
the other, in this case Salga, the drive to settle is diminished and, consequently, 
the ‘ripeness’ to settle.  
 
3.6 Applying strike theory to the 2011 strike – where did it all go wrong? 
Andrew Levy, commenting on the 2011 municipal strike noted that ‘there have not 
been many strikes in the recent history of South African labour that have failed as 
dismally’. That, it must be said, are views expressed by a labour economist. 
Organisationally Samwu must have felt the pain even more. This section explores 
where it all went wrong, before, during and after the strike action. 
Before the Strike 
Perhaps the most decisive mistake Samwu made was to call off their strike action 
prior to the local government elections. They had all the leverage and would have 
been in a position to secure a wage settlement favourable to their members. As it 
ended up, they bowed under political pressure from the top brass of the ruling 
ANC who promised them concessions post the elections. None of those 
concessions were realised and, with that, the leverage Samwu had.  
 How important was the union’s wage demand in the context of the three 
year wage agreement? Was proper research done on this? It must be accepted 
that the 2011 negotiations happened by default. If CPI stood at, for example, 5 per 
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 The term Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) is a concept coined by Roger Fisher and 
William Ury. See in this regard Fisher, Ury and Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without 
giving in, second edition, Random House Business Books, 1991.  
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cent than there would have been no re-opening of negotiations and workers would 
have needed to be content with a 7 per cent wage adjustment. The unions could 
do nothing under those circumstances given the currency of the wage agreement. 
Equally important, could a demand of 18 per cent or R2000 be justified as a 
legitimate demand that members will rally around in a period of relative low 
inflation if inflation is used as the yardstick to determine wage increases?  
 There is a sense that members were not regularly kept informed on the 
legal processes to determine whether wage negotiations could be re-opened or 
not. This would signal a breakdown in communication between leadership and the 
membership base. Whilst it is accepted that these legal processes takes long to be 
determined (and therein the difficulty to regularly communicate any progress) it is 
critical to at least use those periods to prepare members for potential outcomes 
and responses thereto. This appeared not to have been the case.  
 Were members prepared for strike action? Levy commented that Samwu 
members were suffering from strike fatigue given the high prevalence of strike 
action in the sector. Was this tested before the strike? Perhaps the bigger question 
is this: what per cent of Samwu members indicated their support for strike action?  
Surely the National leadership of the union had to be aware of the discontent 
within the Gauteng province of the union. After all, media reports of that discontent 
surfaced in the media prior to the intended strike action. Was there any 
intervention and, if not, why not? With the union’s Gauteng province being the 
largest in terms of membership base, it would be suicidal to pursue strike action 
without their support. One Samwu NEC member interviewed believed that the 
national structure was misled by provinces to believe that members are ready for 
strike action. If that is the case surely it implies that there is a breakdown between 
leadership and their base constituency, the membership.  
 A strike committee at the workplace is a useful tool to prepare workers for 
strike action and to manage the strike when in progress. The strike committee 
could also be the link to keep contact with the union office. There appear to be 
little evidence that strike committees existed to manage the strike or that there was 
any move to establish strike committees.  
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 Lastly, it is important to sensitise the broader community about the intended 
strike action. This is particularly important in the municipal sector where services 
are rendered to local communities. Communities need to understand the reasons 
for the strike action with a view of supporting it. This appears not to have been the 
case and is indicative of a poor media communication strategy.  
During the strike 
Assuming members indicated their support for strike action prior to the strike, were 
those members participating in the strike? Unions tend not to keep record of 
members supporting strike action and are accordingly not able to account for the 
level of support during strike action. It is therefore by no accident that the strike 
data relied on was supplied by the employer body. Surely the level of support 
during the strike determines the strategies to be adopted at that time. So if, as 
Levy commented, that only 20 per cent of Samwu members supported the strike 
action than that surely could be used by the union as a barometer to suspend or 
call off the strike action.  
 It would also appear that the union had no strike plan or programme of 
action. Too often strikes take the form of marches in major cities. This requires 
much coordination in terms of transport arrangements (which are costly), 
compliance with legislative processes155 and, perhaps more importantly, it 
removes workers from the site of struggle, their workplace. The latter is of 
particular importance as strike action at the workplace could deter strike breaking 
or the use of replacement labour. 
 Internal union communication is critical particularly to brief members on the 
state of negotiations. Far too often workers hear about the state of negotiations 
through the mainstream media like television, radio and print media. The primary 
source of information must be internal union communication as, after all, the strike 
primarily affects striking workers. A systematic communication strategy would 
assist the union to communicate the state of negotiations and also facilitate 
obtaining fresh mandates when needed.  
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 Any march must be preceded with an application in terms of the Gatherings act, act 205 of 1993.  
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 Discipline during the strike is an important indicator of how serious workers 
are to fight for their demands. This would include, amongst other, attending union 
report back meetings, ensuring that striking workers are not ill behaved like 
drunkenness and the type of violent behaviour (looting) during the Cape Town 
march. Such conduct has the effect of swaying public opinion against the strike 
action.  
 It would also assist to get political support for the strike action. This would 
however be a difficulty in the municipal sector when your political ally is also your 
employer.  
 What was lacking is a clear education programme teaching workers on the 
nature of strike action and the importance thereof. In this regard the following 
quote aptly spell out the politics of strike action: 
 Strikes … teach the workers to unite; they show them that they can struggle 
 against the capitalists only when they are united; strikes teach the workers to think 
 of the struggle of the whole working class against the whole class of factory 
 owners and against the arbitrary, police government. This is the reason that 
 socialists call strikes “a school of war”, a school in which workers learn to make 
 war on their enemies for the liberation of the whole people, of all who labour, from 
 the yoke of government officials and from the yoke of capital156 
 
After the Strike 
Most importantly, an assessment of the strike is a prerequisite. This assessment 
should ideally include, amongst other, whether, in the opinion of members, the 
strike was a success or failure; whether the strike was supported, not only by 
members but the broader community; whether there are any lessons to be learned 
from the strike; whether members gained any political consciousness; how the 
union should respond to potential disciplinary actions against members etc The 
importance of a strike assessment cannot be overstated as the lessons of the last 
strike are meant to prepare you for any potential future strike action.  
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Chapter 4 
Concluding remarks - Are there lessons to be learned? 
4.1 The bargaining arrangement – A need to rethink? 
Collective bargaining has become a sophisticated area of trade union activities. 
Long gone are the days when workers simply demanded X per cent or X rand 
increases. But why? There is no legal impediment stating what parties must 
demand or settle on either in terms of monetary or per cent wage adjustments. 
That is left to the bargaining parties. Why then can workers not demand what they 
believe is a legitimate improvement to their wage and conditions of employment? 
After all, your bargaining power is measured not by the skill of your negotiating 
team but rather your organisational strength.157 It is that area that these concluding 
remarks will focus on. In suggesting a number of areas for consideration I am 
mindful that these suggestions are preliminary and not exhaustive.   
 The above may, in part, be correct but it is negated by present-day realities. 
South Africa no longer operates within its own cocoon as has been the case under 
apartheid. Developments within the economy, including local government, either 
impacts or is impacted on by global trends. One significant impact is the changing 
nature of formal permanent employment. A large section of the working population 
is located in the informal or less formal employment relations than 20 years ago. 
More significantly is the fact that many of these workers are not unionised or 
enjoying formal collective bargaining arrangements. Labour broking is perhaps the 
most common of such experiences. Notwithstanding these trends, trade unions 
have done little to recruit and organise these categories of workers. The key 
demand has been for the outright banning of labour broking. Such a demand is not 
likely to stand the test of a Constitutional Court ruling, if challenged, if regard is to 
be had for a similar challenge in the Namibian Supreme Court of Appeal158 and the 
fact that it is regulated by International law.159 The better option is to organise 
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 I do however believe that if you have skilled negotiators than you are closer to attaining your goals 
than having individuals with a lack of negotiating skills.  
158 AFRICA PERSONNEL SERVICES (PTY) LTD V GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA AND OTHERS 
2009 (2) NR 596 (SC). 
159
 See in this regard Article 1(b) of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 181 on Private 
Employment Agencies. Available at http://actrav.itcilo.org/octrav-
english/telearn/global/ilo/law/ilo181.htm.  (Accessed on 02 February 2013).  
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labour broker staff with a linked demand that they should be directly employed by 
municipalities.  
 Critical to any negotiations is researching the sector you operate in. After 
all, your demands must be informed by the peculiarities of your sector, locally and 
internationally. So if, for example, there is an emerging school of thought 
advancing a perspective that public sector unions are more privileged than their 
private sector counterparts, it becomes important to understand and counter such 
perspectives. For if you do not that perspective becomes the dominant view that 
shapes the mind of the broader public.  
 So too is the importance of understanding the political landscape you 
operate in – at the earliest opportunity. Unions, in the current period, have become 
organisations responding to developments rather than setting the scene for 
change. This is a departure from the height of the union movement between the 
periods 1973 to 1994 when unions, at least those affiliated to COSATU, tabled 
demands broader than workplace issues. In this regard, and mindful of the Samwu 
characterisation of Salga, how do you define that relationship given that the ruling 
ANC is in effect the political party controlling Salga? As pointed out earlier, the 
suspension of the Samwu strike prior to the 2011 municipal elections is a case in 
point. As such, your political affiliation must be based alongside class lines and not 
some auxiliary reasons.  
 Also, contemporary collective bargaining in the municipal sector concerns 
itself primarily with wage and wage related demands.160 For a union that operates 
in a sector that is the deliverer of service delivery, demands that would improve 
service delivery to, in particular, working class communities should be a key 
component of wage bargaining demands. This has however not been the case. 
This is rather surprising given the extensive congress resolutions Samwu adopted 
affecting local communities. There is an almost immediate need for the trade union 
to build an axis with community organisations. The high level of service delivery 
                                                          
160
 I note however that the last two rounds of wage bargaining had as a key demand the filling of vacant 
positions within the sector. The 2009 wage collective agreement, for example, stipulated that ‘All vacant, 
funded, critical and essential posts at all levels in Municipalities shall be filled on or before 1 July 2010, 
after such posts have been submitted to the appropriate forum for consultation.’ The wording of the 
agreement has however been the subject of conflicting interpretations with the resulting effect that not 
much reliance  could be placed on its enforcement.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
66 
 
 
 
protest over the last few years is indicative of such a need.161 Such an axis is also 
likely to lay to rest the view that trade unions only seek to advance the interest of 
their members.     
 The fact that wage and wage related conditions of employment are 
exclusively negotiated at central level presents its own problems. The following 
quote perhaps best articulate that view: 
 … focusing entirely on centralised bargaining almost inevitably leads to a 
 weakening of shopfloor organisation, and less control by union members 
 over the collective bargaining process. The result is the distancing of union 
 officials from members and a decline in democratic decision-making in the 
union. In the old industrial council system this resulted in bureaucratic trade 
unions and the disappearance of worker militancy.162 
  
 Unless unions find the balance between centralised collective bargaining 
and bargaining subject matters that directly involve rank and file members, the 
above observation may prove to be the future of Samwu – and with that the 
‘disappearance of worker militancy’. Even under a framework of centralised 
collective bargaining, the direct involvement of members is crucial. Too often 
members are presented with a set of recommendations which is difficult to 
influence. As a result they assume no ownership of the demands submitted for 
bargaining. A system needs to be devised where members are comfortable to 
interact even with the most complicated of bargaining subject matters.  
 To achieve the above point will require an overhaul of union education. 
Union education, despite congress resolutions to the contrary, is only located at 
the level of shop stewards. Even that training is limited in respect of meeting the 
challenges of current day unionism. Education, particularly political education, is 
required at the level of ordinary members enabling them to uphold constituency 
based mandating and accountability of union leaders and officials.   
                                                          
161 News 24 (21 January 2013) reported that there were 3 258 police recorded service delivery protest in 
the country between January 2009 and November 2012. This amount to service delivery classified protest 
every second day in South Africa. Available at http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/SA-has-a-
protest-every-two-days-20130121 (Accessed on 02 February 2013).  
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 Godfrey & Bamu op cit note 12 at 222. 
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 Wage demands must take the form of constituency based proposals thus 
ensuring that members are directly involved in determining wage demands. These 
proposals should in turn be reported and debated at local shop stewards 
committees and regional shop stewards councils. These shop stewards meetings 
should not simply take the form of reporting on their mandates as a means to 
consolidate workplace demands but should be vigorously debated amongst all. 
Where possible, representative bodies of the local communities must be invited to 
articulate their specific demands. These must be followed by provincial collective 
bargaining conferences and ultimately, a national collective bargaining conference. 
Naturally, the outcome of the national conference should be reported to members 
as an outcome of their demands. This is the democratic centralism that should 
exist in developing union positions, not just around wage demands but other policy 
considerations. Ideally, such a model will serve an even better purpose if it is a 
joint collaboration between Samwu and Imatu.    
 As Godfrey and Bamu points out, unless there is a strong sense of shop 
floor organisation, members could lose their militancy and, I argue, a sense of 
organisation. The recent developments in the mining industry and indeed the 
agricultural sector should be an eye opener to the traditional trade unions. The 
final conclusion is a warning to trade unions, as well as employers: Shape up or 
else.    
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